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THE
MUJADDID'S CONCEPTION
OF TAWHID

Imam-i-Rabbanī Mujaddid-i-Alf-i-Thāni
Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi's Conception of Tawhīd

OR

THE MUJADDID'S CONCEPTION OF TAWHID

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With a foreword by

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Dedicated'
to
my revered teacher
Dr. Syed Zafarul Hasan.
who watched my life with paternal concern
and
at whose feet I learnt to understand
the fundamental problems
in
Philosophy and Religion

FOREWORD

IN this treatise Dr. Burhan Ahmad Faruqi has drawn our attention to a central point of religion, mysticism and philosophy. شیخ اکبر affirmed وحدت وجود which thereby became a widely accepted doctrine amongst Islamic sufis. شیخ مجدد firmly and solemnly denied it, and persisted in his denial throughout his career; and he based his denial, not on extraneous considerations, but on mystic experience itself. Dr. Burhan has formulated and clarified the issue between these two great mystics with a care and perspicuity which deserves praise; and he has brought religion and philosophy to bear on it. In this connection his discourse on the distinction of Religious Consciousness from mystic consciousness and speculative consciousness is indeed illuminating; while the logic of his contention and the cogency of his arguments seem to leave little to desire. Now

after the relapse of Islamic mysticism again into *وحدت وجود*, it was high time that an earnest study of this kind should have been undertaken and pursued with the thoroughness characteristic of Dr. Burhan Ahmad's work.

Another conspicuous service of Dr. Burhan Ahmad's book is that it has brought the great Mujaddid and his far-reaching movement within the purview of western orientalists. Certainly it is most interesting to note how deeply has this unique personality influenced the nerve of Islamic thought, specially in India, throughout the last three and a half centuries. The inquiry if pursued further and still more in detail will, I believe, repay the time and labour bestowed upon it.

It has been my privilege to watch the growth of this valuable treatise at every stage of its development. I can confidently recommend it to all Muslim scholars and western orientalists for sympathetic study and careful scrutiny.

Aligarh

S. Z. HASAN

30-9-40

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ABBREVIATIONS

- AM. = 'Awn-ul-Ma'būd fi Sharḥ Abū Dāūd (Ar.), by Mawlwi Shamsul Haq of Patna, Anṣārī Press, Delhi, 1323 A.H.
- At. = 'Abaqāt (Ar.), by Mawlwi Shāh Ismā'īl Shahīd, (undated).
- DB. = Damagh-ul-Bāṭil (Per.), by Shāh Rafī'-uddīn, MS. No. 1699, Oriental Library, Bankipur.
- Ep. = Epistle.
- FH. = Fuṣūṣ-ul-Ḥikam (Ar.), by Ibn 'Arabī, MS.
- FM. = Futuhāt Makkīyya (Ar.), by Ibn 'Arabī, Darul-Kutub al-'Arabia, Egypt, 1329 A.H.
- FW. = Fayṣilat-u-Waḥadat-ul-wujūd-waḥ-shuhūd (Ar.), by Shāh Walī-Ullah, Aḥmadī Press, Delhi, 1324 A.H.
- HQ. = Urdu Translation of Khwāja Badr-uddīn's Ḥadrāt-ul-Quds, Islamia Steam Press, Lahore, 1341 A.H.
- IK. = 'Ilm-ul-Kitāb (Per.), by Khwāja Mīr Dard, Anṣārī Press Delhi, 1308 A.H.
- KH. = Kalimat-ul-Haqq (Per.), by Mawlwi Ghulām Yaḥyā, MS. Shefta Collection, Lytton Library, M. U., Aligarh.
- KhA. = Khazīnat-ul-Āṣfiya (Per.), by Ghulām Sarwar Lāhawri, Thamar-i-Hind Press, Lucknow, 1290 A.H.
- M. = Maktūbāt-i-Imām-i-Rabbānī (Per.), by Shāikh Aḥmad Sirhindī, edited by M. Nūr Aḥmad, printed at Amritsar, 1334 A.H.
- MM. = Mabda-o-Ma'ād (Per.), by Shāikh Aḥmad Sirhindī, Mujaddidī Press, Amritsar, 1330 A.H.

- MT. = *Muntakhab-ul-Tawārīkh* (Per.), by Mullā 'Abdul 'Qādir Badāyūnī, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1865 A.D.
- MtM. = *Maqāmāt-i-Maẓharī* (Per.), by Shāh Ghulām 'Alī, Muḥtabāi Press, Delhi, 1309 A.H.
- NA. = *Nala-i-'Andalīb* (Per.), by Khwāja Mīr Naṣīr 'Andalīb, Shāhjahānī Press, Bhūpāl, 1310 A.H.
- Q. = *Qur-ān*. Anjuman-i-Himāyat-i-Islam edition, Lahore, 1354 A.H.
- RQ. = Urdu Translation of Khwāja Kamāl-uddīn's *Rauḍat-ul-Qayyūmiyya*, Civil Steam Press, Lahore (undated).
- SA. = *Sawānīh Aḥmadī*, by Ja'far 'Alī, Ṣūfī Publishing Co. Pindi Bahā-uddīn, Steam Press, Lahore (undated).
- SM. = *Shirāt-i-Mustaqīm* (Per.), by Mawlā Shāh Ismā'īl Shāhīd, Muḥtabāi Press, Delhi, 1322 A.H.
- ShF. = *Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ-ul-Hikam* (Ar.), by 'Abdur Razzāq al-Qāshānī, Maymaniyya Press, Egypt, 1321 A.H.
- TA. = *Tadhkirat-ul-Awliyā* (Per.), by Farīd-uddīn 'Attār, Muḥtabāi Press, Delhi, 1305 A.H.
- TtA. = *Taṣnīf-i-Ahmadiyya* (Urdu), by Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, Aligarh Institute Press, Aligarh, 1300 A.H.
- TJ. = *Tuzuk-i-Jahāngīrī* (Per.), by Mirzā Hādī, edited by Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, his private Press, Aligarh, 1281 A.H.
- ZM. = *Zubdat-ul-Maqāmāt* (Per.), by Khwāja Muḥammad Hāshim, Maḥmūd Press, Lucknow, 1310 A.H.

PRELIMINARY

THIS dissertation is an attempt to work out the conception of Tawḥīd in the thought of that great Islamic mystic, viz., Shaikh Aḥmad Sirhindī, who is generally called the Mujaddid-i-Alf-i-Thānī¹ (the

¹ The word Mujaddid can be translated as the Reformer, the Regenerator, or the Renewer. I prefer Renewer.

The idea of Mujaddid has its origin in the ḥadīth:

ان الله يبعث في هذه الامة على رأس كل مائة سنة من
يجدد لها امر دينها -

“God will, on the eve of every century, raise a person in this nation (Islām) who would renew the religion”: Abū Dāūd (202-275 A.H.). It is maintained that many persons have accordingly been the Mujaddids of their centuries, e.g., ‘Umar b. ‘Abdul ‘Azīz (d. 101 A.H.)—First Century; Imām Shāfi‘ī Muḥammad b. Idrīs (d. 204 A.H.)—Second Century; Ibn Suraij (d. 306 A.H.)—Third Century; Imām Bāqillānī Muḥammad b. Tayyab (d. 403 A.H.) or Imām Asfrāyyinī Aḥmad b. Muḥammad (d. 406 A.H.)—Fourth Century; Imām Ghazzālī (d. 505 A.H.)—Fifth Century; Imām Fakhruddīn Rāzī (d. 606

Renewer of Islām on the Head of the second thousand of the Islamic Era). The Shaikh himself had the inspired belief that he was a Mujaddid.¹

A.H.)—Sixth Century; Ibn Daqīq Al'īd Muḥammad b. 'Alī (d. 702 A.H.)—Seventh Century; Imām Bulqīnī Sirājuddīn (d. 905 A.H.)—Eighth Century; Jalāluddīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 911 A.H.)—Ninth Century, and others of the subsequent centuries. (Cf. AM., Vol. IV, p. 181). However, it is noteworthy that only Shaikh Aḥmad has claimed the dignity of the Mujaddid-i-Alf-i-Thani for himself.

Khawāja Kamāluddīn Muḥammad Aḥsān has quoted two ḥadīthes in روضة القيومية :

(۱) يبعث رجل على احد عشر مائة سنة هو نور عظيم اسمه اسمى بين السلاطين الجابرين يدخل الجنة بشفاعته رجال الوفا (جامع الدرر)

"A man will arise at the beginning of the 11th century, who will be a great light and whose name will be the same as mine : (he will arise) amidst tyrant kings; thousands of men will enter Paradise through his intercession."

(۲) يكون رجلا في امتي يقال له صلة يدخل الجنة بشفاعته كذا و كذا (جمع الجوامع)

"There will be a man in my nation who will be called a 'conjoiner,' through whose intercession there will enter Paradise so-and-so."

It is believed that these predictions were made about Shaikh Aḥmad. (See RQ., Part I, pp. 37-38.)

¹ The Mujaddid keenly realises the need of a great Reformer

It was Mullā 'Abdul Ḥakīm of Sialkot (d. 1067 A.H.), the most illustrious scholar of the day and the Shāikh-al-Islām of India, who was the first to apply to Shāikh Aḥmad the epithet of Mujaddid-i-Alf-i-Thānī.¹ Indeed all the divines and mystics of eminence have acknowledged him as such. For example, Shāh Walī-Ullah² and his son Shāh 'Abdul

in a letter to his son Khwāja Muḥammad Sādiq (1000-1025 A.H.). See M., Vol. I, Ep. 234. Further he expressly claims for himself the dignity of Mujaddid-i-Alf-i-Thānī. See M., Vol. II, Ep. 4. Again writing to his son, Khwāja Muḥammad Ma'ṣūm (1009-1079 A.H.) he says

الحمد لله الذى جعلنى صلةً بين البحرين و مصلحا بين
الفيثتين

"Praise be to Allah who created me a conjoiner between two oceans and a pacifier between two parties. (See M., Vol. II, Ep. 6.). The reference is perhaps to the last Ḥadīth in the preceding note.

¹ KA., Vol. I, p. 614.

² Shāh Walī-Ullah (1114-1176 A.H.). He was the most eminent divine of his age, and a mystic too. He belonged to the Mujaddidī Naqṣhbandī School. He acquired mystic discipline from his father, Shāh 'Abdur Raḥīm, and is said to be the 'Mujaddid' of his time. He is the founder of a school in Ḥadīth and Tafsīr. He translated the Qur-ān into Persian and is the author of many famous works on Ḥadīth, Theology, and Mysticism.

'Azīz,¹ among a host of others, always speak of him as Mujaddid-i-Alf-i-Thānī. The latter is also reported to have said that amongst the mystics of Islām, Shaikh 'Abdul Qādir Jīlānī (470-560 A.H.) and Shaikh Aḥmad Sirhindī are the two greatest, only he could not decide which was the greater of the two.

Shaikh Aḥmad is the first and the greatest among the mystics of Islām who expressly and strenuously opposed the Pantheistic conception of Tawhid known as Wahdat-i-Wujūd² or Tawhid-i-Wujūdī. This conception had become almost universal amongst Muslim

¹ Shāh 'Abdul 'Azīz (1159-1248 A.H.) was the eldest son of Shāh Walī-Ullah. He was the most celebrated scholar of his day and universally respected like his father. He taught Ḥadīth to the famous mystic Shāh Sayyid Aḥmad Barelwī, and also initiated him into the Naqshbandī School. He wrote many works on Kalām and Ḥadīth.

² Wahdat-i-Wujūd (وحدت وجود) or Tawhid-i-Wujūdī (توحید وجودی) is unity of Being. It is the doctrine of very many mystics in Islām. The exact equivalent would be Unityism—that is, existent is one. This soon becomes Identityism—that it is identical with everything else, which in the end passes on to pantheism,—that it is God and God is all. *It

mystics, specially since Ibn 'Arabī¹ who wrote on it extensively and has had enormous influence on the subsequent thought of Islām, and gave it a strenuous push forward.

Now the opposition of Shaikh Ahmad to Wahdat-i-Wujūd is based not on theological dogma or philosophical argument, but on Kashf² or direct religious experience. Con-

is also called Wujūdiyyat. Hence Wujūdiyyin or Ṣufiya-i-Wujūdiyya or Mawāhidīn are those who believe in Unityism.

¹ Ibn 'Arabī, Muḥayyuddīn (560-638 A.H.) was a mystic of great eminence. He is generally styled as Shaikh-i-Akbar, the Greatest Shaikh. He was born at Murcia in Spain, but he shifted to Seville which he made his home for thirty years. In 598 A.H. he set out for the East from where he never returned home. He visited Mecca and Mosul. His fame went with him everywhere. Finally he settled down in Damascus where he died in 638 A.H. He belonged to the Zāhirī School, but rejected Taqlīd in doctrinal matters. Ibn 'Arabī's sole guide was inner light with which he believed himself illuminated in a special way. He is said to be the author of as many as 400 books. The most famous of his works are Futūḥat-i-Makkiyya and Fuṣūṣ-ul-Ḥikam. In the latter he has discussed the pantheistic conception of Tawḥīd at length. He was denounced as Zindīq in Egypt, and there was a move to assassinate him. Ibn Taimiyya (661-728 A.H.), one of the greatest divines in Islām, criticised Ibn 'Arabī unreservedly.

² "Kashf (كشف): Literally means unveiling; it is apprehen-

sequently it gave rise to burning controversies among mystics. Many scholars and mystics of eminence took exception to his position while others emphatically affirmed it. It is worth while to go into the matter at length and try to determine its exact position as best as we can.

sion of facts and events as well as truths, mundane and celestial, by inner sight or light : generally it is symbolic.—*Shuhūd* (شهود) is direct apprehension of the being and attributes of God.—*Ilhām* (الهام) is inspiration ; technically it is confined to mystics ; it is reception of guidance or inspiration from above. The guidance thus received is not absolutely infallible, hence it is not binding on all but only on the recipient of it, provided it is not contrary to any injunction received through the Prophet.—*Wahī* (وحى) is literally communication or command ; technically it is communication imparted by God to a prophet, its highest form being communication through the agency of an angel. Guidance received through it is absolutely sure and binding on all. Generally Revelation may be regarded as an equivalent term to *Wahī*, but the exact significance of the term is as described above.

Biographical Sketch

A BRIEF biographical sketch of Shaikh Aḥmad, with special reference to his times, would not be out of place here.

Shaikh Aḥmad is a descendant of 'Umar, the Great. He was born in Sirhind in 971 A.H. Sirhind is really Sahrand, which means the forest of tigers. It is related that in the days of Feroz Shāh Tughlaq (752-790 A.H.) once the royal treasury was passing through this forest under the imperial guard. A saint, Ṣāhib-i-Kashf¹ was travelling along with the treasury. When the caravan reached the spot where Sirhind is now situated, the saint had the inspiration that a very great saint will be born at the place. The news reached the King. He ordered the construction of a

¹ Ṣāhib-i-Kashf (صاحب کشف) is saint, rather a person who has spiritual illumination.

town there and entrusted the work to Imām Rafī'uddīn,¹ the ancestor of Shaikh Aḥmad. While the construction was in progress, Shāh Bū 'Alī Qalandar² came and helped in it, and informed Imām Rafī' that the great saint of the prophecy would be his descendant.³

Shaikh Aḥmad received his early education at home. He learnt the Qur-ān⁴ by heart

¹Imām Rafī'uddīn is the sixth ancestor of the Mujaddid. He was the brother of Khwāja Fateḥ-Ullah the prime minister of Feroz Shāh Tughlaq and a disciple of the famous saint Sayyid Jalāl Bukhārī (707-750 A.H.) known as Mukhdūm-i-Jahānian. Imām Rafī' was entrusted with the management of the town of Sirhind where he settled down after its construction.

²Sharfuddīn Bū 'Alī Shāh Qalandar of Panipat was a saint of very great eminence. He came from 'Iraq to Panipat, where he died in 724 A.H. It is related that he helped in the construction of the town of Sirhind. However the dates do not tally. For Feroz Shāh in whose time Sirhind was constructed began his reign in 752 A.H., i.e., 28 years after the death of the Qalandar.

³RQ., Part I, pp. 22-23.

⁴The Qur-ān is the book revealed to Muḥammad word by word and letter by letter. It is the source of all the teachings of Islām. All other sources must be in harmony with it. It is also called Kitāb (کتاب)—the Book. Ḥadīth (حدیث) is the second source. It embodies the sayings and doings of Muḥammad.

very early. Then he took to the study of Hadīth, Tafsīr or Exegesis and Ma'qūl (معقول) or Philosophy and went to renowned scholars at various places. When he was at Agra, studying Hadīth and Tafsīr, Abul Faḍl and Faiḍī, Emperor Akbar's right hand men, hearing of his brilliance, tried to draw him into their circle. However, this friendship did not last very long, because the Shaikh took serious offence to Abul Faḍl's anti-Islamic attitude. It is said that a portion of Faiḍī's celebrated *Sawāṭi'-al-Ilhām*¹ was written by

and as a source of Islām it is next in authority to the Qur-ān. Ijmā' (إجماع) is the third source of Islām; it means the consensus of the faithful on a point which is not to be found explicitly in the Qur-ān and the Hadīth. Qiyās (قياس) means inference. By some it is regarded as the fourth source of Islām. In order to be valid it should be based on the Qur-ān and Hadīth (and on Ijmā').

¹ *Sawāṭi'-al-Ilhām* (سواطع الإلهام) known as "Tafsīr-i-bi nuqat" (تفسير بے نقط) is a commentary on the Qur-ān in Arabic written by Abul Faiḍ Faiḍī, the poet-laureate of Akbar, which has the very difficult peculiarity of containing no letter with a dot. It is noteworthy that the Arabic alphabet has 15 dotted letters.

the Shaikh.¹

After finishing his education at an early age the Shaikh took to mystic discipline under the guidance of his father who was an eminent mystic and received Khilāfat² from him in the Chishtiya and Suhrawardiya orders.³ When he was 28 he went to Delhi and joined the Naqshbandiya order, and soon received its Khilāfat from Khwāja Bāqī-Billah (972-1012 A.H.).⁴ The Khwāja is the person from whom this order begins in India. It is said that he was directed in a vision to leave his home, Afghanistan, and go to India, where he had to initiate a very great man into the order.⁵ This great man was Shaikh Ahmad

¹ RQ., Part I, pp. 60, 62, 63; Cf. HQ., Vol. II, pp. 9-10.

² Khilāfat (خلافت): In mystic terminology it is generally the recognition of the spiritual leader that the disciple has completed the mystic journey and has reached such a high stage of development that he can be authorised to guide others on the way.

³ RQ., Part I, pp. 69-70.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 76-81.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73.

who quickly went through all the stages of the mystic journey, and became so great at it that even the Khwāja used to sit before him as a disciple,¹ and confessed that it was through Shaikh Aḥmad's spiritual help that he got out of the mazes of *Wahdat-i-Wujūd*²

¹ RQ., Part I, p. 113.

² ZM., p. 155.

HIS TIMES

1.—*Mystics*

WHEN the great Mujaddid came to his task of reform, he found that Taṣawwuf¹ had taken complete possession of the Muslim soul. A Pantheistic Deity had been substituted for the Monotheistic, Personal, Transcendent God of Islām.² Excessive belief in Karāmāt or miracles of saints was commonly cherished. Many un-Islamic means of the development of occult powers had been introduced into Taṣawwuf itself. The mystics had gone to the extent of denying the commandments of Shari'at³ or the Law of Islām

¹ Taṣawwuf (تصوف) or Islamic mysticism is an attempt to have the direct experience of what the Prophet of Islām himself is supposed to have experienced.

² MT., Vol. II, p. 258.

³ Shari'at (شریعت) Law, the Code of Islām which prescribes various modes of action and practice. — Tariqat (طریقت)

as universally binding, and to regard Shari'at itself as something external and superficial; indulgence in Simā'¹ or music hearing had become the order of the day. They were indifferent to the *Sunnat* or the example of the Prophet. They extolled Sukr² or ecstasy above Ṣaḥw, or sane rationality. The dia-

is the way towards God through purification of soul, for which some extra ascetic means are adopted by the mystic.—Ma'rifat (معرفت) is the knowledge of God acquired through spiritual development, inner purification and illumination.—Haqīqat (حقیقت) is the truth underlying the Shari'at as grasped through spiritual illumination. According to the Mujaddid the Shari'at is the Code of Islām. Tariqat is the attempt to remove the conflict and a sense of revolt against the injunctions of Shari'at. Ma'rifat is the realisation that man cannot know God directly; and Haqīqat is the perfect faith in the truth of the actions prescribed by Shari'at.

¹ Simā' (سماع) means music hearing for the sake of bringing about ecstasy, prevalent in mystic orders.

² Sukr (سکر) is intoxication. It is that state of a mystic's mind in which he is overpowered by the love or vision or realisation of God, and more or less loses control of his self and reason.—Ṣaḥw (صحو) is opposed to Sukr, i.e., sobriety. It is the state of mind in which man has full control of his self and his reason and is not overpowered by emotion. Ṣaḥw is regarded as a state higher than Sukr.

logue¹ between Maḥmūd of Ghaznī and Shaikh Abul Ḥasan Kharqānī is a pertinent example showing clearly that since long the mystics had practically severed their connection with Islām and the Prophet.

2.—The Theologians

FURTHER, the 'Ulamā' or theologians had

¹ Sultān Maḥmūd (d. 421 A.H.) was once passing by Kharqān. He had heard the fame of Shaikh Abul Ḥasan Kharqānī (d. 419 A.H.). He wished to see the Shaikh. So he sent his messenger to the Shaikh asking his permission to visit him. The Sultān instructed the messenger that if the Shaikh were not willing to grant him an interview he should recite the Quranic verse: اطيعوا الله واطيعوا الرسول واولى الامر منكم "Obey Allah, obey the Prophet and obey the sovereign from amongst you." The Shaikh did not attend to the Sultān's message. The messenger accordingly recited the verse. The Shaikh said:

من در 'اطيعوا الله' چنان مشغولم که در 'اطيعوا الرسول'
خجالتها دارم تا به اولی الامر چه می رسد

"I am so busy with 'obey Allah' that I am ashamed to neglect 'obey the Prophet' how can I obey the sovereign. (See T.A., p. 352.)

taken exclusively to Fiqh or Jurisprudence as the whole of religious learning; they had ceased to refer to the Qur-ān and Ḥadith—the genuine sources of Islām. Consequently only the juristic view of Islām was alive, the spirit of Islām had died. Many a theologian was of the type of Makhdūm-ul-Mulk who, in order to avoid the payment of Zakāt¹ or tax on wealth, transferred his property at the end of the year to his wife and had it retransferred to himself before the time of the payment next year.² They were busy in the hair-splitting discussions of the problems of Fiqh; minutest differences sufficed to cause perennial quarrels among them. They were generally full of ambition, always hunting after worldly success. They could be induced to give Fatwā (فتوى) or decision of the sacred law,

¹Zakāt (زكاة): Tax on wealth prescribed by Islām which is $\frac{1}{40}$ of one's yearly savings. It is one of the five injunctions of Islām.

²MT., Vol. II, p. 203.

permitting the Ḥarām (حرام) or the prohibited and prohibiting the Ḥalāl (حلال) or the permitted. Makhdūm-ul-Mulk is said to have given a Fatwa' that the ordinance of Ḥajj¹ or Pilgrimage was no longer binding, that it had rather become injurious.²)

3.—*Akbar's Policy*

THE policy of reconciliation which the Mughal Emperor Akbar persistently followed throughout his long reign (963-1013 A.H.) was naturally calculated to hurt and weaken the religious consciousness of Musalmāns. In certain of its phases it outraged their feelings. They felt that Islām was undone in India. Mullā 'Abdūl Qādir Badāyūnī,

¹ It is binding on every Muslim to go on pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in his life, provided he can afford the expenses of the journey.

² MT., Vol. II, pp. 203, 259.

a contemporary historian and a zealous Musalmān, describes the state of things prevailing in Akbar's time, and his description mirrors the sore uneasiness under which every religious Musalmān of the day was suffering. Mullā Badāyūnī says that the Emperor wanted to win over his Hindu subjects. He, therefore, turned his face against Islām.¹ He started encouraging 'Ulamā'-i-Sū (علماء سو), i.e., the worldly divines, who would do everything to win his favour. He managed to surround himself with people who really did not believe in revelation and the religious code. To believe in revelation was considered as Taqlīd² or following authority blindly—a low kind of mentality and fit only for the

¹ MT., Vol. II, p. 255.

² Taqlīd (تقليد) literally means to follow; technically it means acknowledging Ijmā' (اجماع) and Qiyās (قياس) of a competent divine as the sources of Islām besides the Qur-ān and the Hadīth. Muqallid (مقلد) is one who believes in Ijmā' and Qiyās of some divine as the sources of Islām as regards the point not explicitly found in the Qur-ān or the Hadīth.—Ghair

uneducated and the illiterate. Nay, the Emperor went further. He openly opposed Islām. He regarded the injunctions of Islām as temporary and irrational. "In these days, when reproach began to be cast upon the doctrines of Islām and all questions relating thereto, and ever so many wretches of Hindus and Hinduised Musalmāns brought unmitigated revilings on the Prophet; and the villainously irreligious 'Ulamā' in their works pronounced the Emperor to be infallible and contenting themselves with mentioning the unity of God, they next mentioned the various titles of the Emperor, and did not have the courage to mention the name of the Prophet (God be gracious to him and his followers, and give them peace in defiance of the liars); this was the state of things which became the cause of general disgrace, and the seeds of depravity and disturbance

Muqallid (غیر مقلد) is one who denies Ijmā' and Qiyās as the sources of Islām and sticks to the Qur-ān and the Ḥadīth.

began to sprout out in the empire. Besides this the mean people of the higher and lower classes, having put the collar of spiritual obedience to the Emperor upon their necks, professed themselves to be his disciples.”¹ The Emperor had ceased to believe in the Qur-ān; he did not believe in life after death, nor in the Day of Judgment.² He had gone further. He had determined publicly to use the formula لا اله الا الله اكبر خليفة الله “There is no god but Allah, and Akbar is God’s Representative.” But as this led to commotions, he thought it wiser to restrict the use of this formula to a few people within the precincts of the Haram.³ Sajda⁴ or the form of prostration reserved by Islām for God alone, was

¹ MT., Vol. II, p. 269.

² *Ibid.*, p. 273.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Sajda (سجده) is a form of prostration reserved by Islām exclusively for Allah and forbidden to anyone else. A distinction was made, *viz.*, Sajda to Allah is Sajda'-i-'Ibādat (سجده عبادت) and the same act if performed before kings is Sajda'-i-Ta'zīmī (سجده تعظیمی).

made compulsory before the Emperor.¹

Wine was declared lawful,² and bacon was made an ingredient of wine;³ Jizya⁴ or the military tax was abolished⁵ and beef was declared unlawful.⁶ Pigs and dogs were specially reared and regarded as manifestations of God.⁷ The Ṣalāt (صلاة) or the prescribed prayers, the Ṣaum (صوم) or the prescribed fasts and the Ḥajj or pilgrimage to Mecca were abolished.⁸ The Islamic calendar was replaced by the new-fangled Ilāhī months and years.⁹ Indeed Islām after a thousand years was considered to have played itself out; the study of Arabic was looked upon as if it

¹ MT., Vol. II, p. 259.

² *Ibid.*, p. 301.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 302.

⁴ Jizya (جزيه) is the military tax collected from the unbelievers to maintain the Army for their protection.

⁵ MT., Vol. II, p. 276.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 305.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 306.

⁹ *Ibid.*

were something unlawful; the Law of Islām or Fiqh, Tafsīr or the exegesis of the Qur-ān and Ḥadīth or the traditions of the Prophet were ridiculed; and those who prosecuted these studies were looked down as deserving of contempt.¹

The Aḍḥān (الاذان) or call to the prayers, and the Namāz-i-Jamā'at (نماز جماعت) or congregational prayers which used to be, as prescribed by Islām, offered five times a day in the state hall were stopped.² Such names as Aḥmad, Muḥammad and Muṣṭafā, the various names of the Prophet of God, had become offensive to the Emperor, and to utter them was a crime.³ Mosques and prayer rooms were changed into store-rooms and into Hindu guardrooms.⁴

Islām was in great distress. Unbelievers could openly ridicule and condemn Islām and the Musalmāns. The rites of Hinduism were

¹ MT., Vol. II, pp. 306-307.

² *Ibid.*, p. 314.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 322.

celebrated in every street and corner, while Musalmāns were not permitted to carry out the injunctions of Islām. The Hindus when they observed fast could compel the Musalmāns not to eat and drink in public, while they themselves could eat and drink publicly during Ramaḍān. At several places Musalmāns had to pay with their lives for sacrificing the cow on 'Īd-al-Aḍhā. A number of mosques were destroyed by Hindus and temples erected in their place.¹

Thus the times cried for the appearance of a great reformer. Shaikh Aḥmad was a spiritual man and at the age of forty, i.e., in the year 1011 A.H., he felt the call. He had the inspiration that he was the Renewer of the second millennium of the Islamic era.² But the task before him was stupendous. Long he worked, and strenuous and constant were the efforts he made to turn the tide. Some

¹ M., Vol. II, Ep. 92.

² See foot-note 1, p. 2, *supra*.

of the means he adopted for this purpose were the following:

Firstly, he prepared a number of his disciples for the work and sent them in all directions to preach the true Islām, to emphasise the Ittibā'-i-Sunnat (اتباع سنة) or following the example of the Holy Prophet, and to bring the people back to the folds of the Shari'at. This work was effectively done, not only in India but even beyond its borders in the neighbouring Muslim countries.¹

Secondly, he started a vast correspondence with men of eminence in various parts of these countries. These epistles were widely circulated. They expounded religious truths, and laid the greatest emphasis on Ittibā'-i-Sunnat.²

Thirdly, he enlisted the great nobles of the Imperial Court as his disciples and used them to bring about a change in the life of those

¹ RQ., Part I, pp. 166-67.

² For example M., Vol. I, Eps. 25, 36, 41, 42, 44, 75, 79, 114, 152, 165, 195, 249, 254, 255, 272.

circles, and to influence the Emperor towards a change of heart.¹

Fourthly, when Akbar died and Jahāngīr succeeded, the Shaikh started a campaign. People had to take a vow that they will not obey any orders contradictory to Islām. This campaign was extended also to army.²

Āṣaf Jāh, the prime minister, advised Jahāngīr to take care of Shaikh Aḥmad whose influence was spreading widely in India, Iran, Turān and Badakhshān. He advised him further to stop the soldiers of the army from visiting the disciples of the Shaikh and taking the vow, and still further to imprison the Shaikh. Jahāngīr issued the orders and Shaikh Aḥmad became a political suspect. Jahāngīr also decided to send the Shaikh to prison. But it was not easy to lay hands on him. The great nobles revered him and were devoted to him.

¹ M., Vol., I, Eps. 23, 25, 43-54, 65-72, 119-21, 191, 194, 195, 198, 209, 214, 228, 231, 238, etc.

² RQ., Part I, pp. 170-74.

So Jahāngīr sent them one by one to distant places—Khān-i-Khānan to Deccan, Ṣadr-i-Jahān to the East, Khān-i-Jahān to Malwa, Khān-i-Ā'zam to Gujrat, and Mahābat Khān to Kabul. Having done this he sent for Shaiikh Aḥmad from Sirhind and accused him of publishing certain un-Islamic ideas in his Epistles. But the Shaiikh met the accusations squarely. Jahāngīr had now to find some other excuse. He demanded Sajda (سجده) or prostration of the Shaiikh. The Shaiikh would not agree to it, because Sajda is exclusively due to God and to no one else. Thereupon Jahāngīr imprisoned the Shaiikh and sent him to the Gwalior Fort, where he remained a prisoner for two years.¹ This imprisonment of the Shaiikh greatly annoyed Mahābat Khān in Kabul and he expunged the name of Jahāngīr from the Khuṭba (خطبه) or Friday sermon and the coin in Kabul, and invaded India with his chosen army. It is narrated that

¹ RQ., Part I, pp. 175-186. Cf. TJ., p. 273.

he virtually took Jahāngīr a prisoner at Jhelum. 'Mahābat might have gone further. But the Shaiikh sent him instructions to obey the King and to cause no disturbance in the realm. Thereupon Mahābat set Jahāngīr free. Soon after followed the release of the Shaiikh from Gwalior (1028 A.H.). The Emperor wished the Shaiikh to see him. The Shaiikh would not come unless certain conditions were accepted. Firstly, that the Emperor would abolish Sajda-i-Ta'zīmī or prostration; secondly, that all the mosques that had been erased should be erected; thirdly, that all orders prohibiting cow-slaughter should be cancelled; fourthly, that Qadīs, Muftīs and censors should be appointed to enforce the Islamic code; fifthly, that Jizya or military tax should be re-introduced; sixthly, that all bid'āt (بدعات) or innovations should be stopped and injunctions of the Shari'at or Law be enforced; and seventhly, that all prisoners who had been sent to prison

in contravention of the above should be released.¹

The Emperor accepted these conditions.² When the Shaikh came to him, the Emperor received him with great honour, giving him a Nadhr (نذر) or monetary offering as well as a Khil'at³ (خلعت) or robe of honour.⁴ Henceforth the Shaikh, for the remaining six years of his life, became the special Adviser of the Emperor.⁵

¹ RQ., Part I, pp. 186-95.

² *Ibid.*, p. 193.

³ TJ., p. 273.

⁴ Mirzā Hādī, the writer of *Tuzuk-i-Jahāngīrī* is annoyingly brief and curt about this whole episode, and the so-called histories too are silent. One has to depend for the details on RQ., which Aḥsān-Ullah 'Abbāsī also follows in his "Life of the Mujaddid".

⁵ Cf. M., Vol. III, Eps. 43, 44; RQ., Part I, pp. 199-209.

HIS ACHIEVEMENTS

THUS, in the first place, the Mujaddid brought the Islamic kingdom of India back to Islām. In the second place, he induced the divines of Islām to the study of Qur-ān and Ḥadīth, which they had neglected so long. In Taṣawwuf or mysticism, he revolutionised the doctrine of Islamic mystics, questioned their pantheism, and brought them round to Ittibā'-i-Sunnat (following the example of the Prophet). Moreover, he widened the bounds of religious experience, by realising and describing a large number of higher stages yet untraversed and unknown to his predecessors.¹ Further he made a fundamental departure from the accepted mystic doctrine inasmuch as he propounded that Wilāyat or sainthood is essentially different from

¹ M., Vol. II, Eps. 4, 6.

Nabūwwat ¹ or Prophethood and not in one line with it—indeed qualitatively different.² Connected with this is the position which the Shaikh established and which had long been perverted, *viz.*, the Din or Religion and not Sulūk-wa-Taṣawwuf ³ or mysticism is the

¹ Nabuwwat (نبوت) means prophecy from which comes the word Prophet. But in Islām it means the stage where a man becomes, in contradistinction to Wilāyat by sheer grace of God, the subject of special divine favour and messages for the guidance of man are sent to him by God. Wilāyat (ولاية) is that stage of spiritual development in which the mystic realises that he has attained to nearness or proximity to God. Everyone can get to it by dint of his continued effort and struggle, though not without the grace of God.

² M., Vol. I, Ep. 260.

³ Sulūk (سلوك) is the method of spiritual development. The thing has been conceived as a journey or pilgrimage to God, similarly Sair (سير) which means rambling. When Sulūk is attained at a certain stage the mystic begins to experience the adumbrations of Asmā'-o-Shuyūn (اسماء و شيون) i.e. divine names and phases. This is called Sair-ila-'llah (سير الى الله) i.e. journey towards Allah. Then he surpasses this stage and enters into the experience of the Being of Allah. This is called Sair-Fi'llah (سير في الله), journey inside Allah. After that the mystic returns back in his journey and this is called Sair-an-Allah (سير عن الله) journey away from Allah. Then

indispensable thing for a Muslim.¹

It is for these great reforms that he was called Mujaddid-i-Alf-i-Thānī—the Reformer of the second millennium. Henceforth we shall speak of him in the text as the Mujaddid.

he resumes his duties as an ordinary human being in consonance with the teachings of Sharī'at and directs his energies like the Prophets to the reformation of his fellow beings

¹ M., Vol. I, Ep. 48.

HIS INFLUENCE,

• IT may be added here that the Mujaddid's influence on subsequent development too has been very great. His was really the call "*Back to Muḥammad*"; and it had had far-reaching consequences. Besides his conception of Tawḥīd which shall be considered in the following pages, this call inherently affected the Islamic mind and gave it a new turn in mysticism as well as in theology,—‘Ilm-i-Bāṭin and ‘Ilm-i-Zāhir.¹

Firstly, with regard to mysticism, there arose a new yearning—a yearning to purify

(¹ ‘Ilm-i-Zāhir (علم ظاهر) is knowledge in general, such as Tafsīr, Ḥadīth, Fiqh and ‘Ilm-i-Ḳalām. ‘Ilm-i-Bāṭin (علم باطن) is cognition attained through mystic efforts. Hence the distinction of ‘Ulamā’-i-Zāhir, those well versed in learning, theologians and jurists, who are guided by the word of the Qur-ān, etc., and not the spirit as the initiated or the mystics who are therefore called ‘Ulamā’-i-Bāṭin, who try to have the direct experience of God and eternity.

mysticism from extraneous elements and draw it exclusively from that pure and perennial fountain-head from which Islām had arisen ; in other words, a yearning to learn it directly from the Prophet of God. 'Accordingly it happened that Khwāja Mīr Nāṣir¹ who belonged to the Mujaddid's school of mysticism got into a trance which lasted for a full week, and Imām Ḥasan, the grandson of the Prophet himself, appeared to him in his cell and initiated him into a new mystic method, insisting that the method shall be called after the Prophet, 'Muḥammadi,' because that was the genuine method of the Prophet

¹ Khwāja Mīr Nāṣir 'Andalīb (d. 1172 A.H.) was a lineal descendant of the celebrated saint Khwāja Bahāuddīn, the founder of Naqshbandia order. In the beginning Khwāja Mīr Nāṣir was a soldier in the Mughal Army. All of a sudden he left the army and took to seclusion. He became a celebrated mystic. Indeed he founded a new order of mysticism called the Tarīqa-i-Muḥammadi (طریقه محمدی) or the method of Muḥammad. He wrote a voluminous book *Nāla'-i-'Andalīb* (نالہ اندلیب) in 1153 A.H. in the form of a story in which he discussed most of the mystic doctrines.

of God. When the trance was over the Khwāja came out of his cell, and the first person whom he initiated in the new method was his son Khwāja Mīr Dard¹ who met him on the threshold.²

The father and son have written voluminous books on the method which they believe to have been the work of inspiration.³ The essence of the method is: "Break away from everyone and attend only to your master (Muḥammad) and continue to attend on him incessantly."⁴ It is, say they, the want of this principle that has created dissensions amongst

¹ Khwāja Mīr Dard (1131-1190 A.H.) was the second son of Khwāja Mīr Nāṣir. At the age of fifteen he wrote a treatise *Asrār-us-Ṣalāt* (اسرار الصلوة). He is the author of several works on mysticism, e.g., *Wāridāt-i-Dard* (واردات درد), *Ilm-ul-Kitāb* (علم الكتاب), etc. He was held in great esteem and even the Mughal Emperor Shāh 'Ālam used to visit his Majlis (مجلس) or gathering every month. Khwāja Dard was also a famous poet of Urdu and has a recognised position in the history of Urdu literature.

² IK., p. 85.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 91, 95.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

Musalmāns. Go back to Kitāb-o-Sunnat,¹ the Qur-ān and the example of the Prophet, and attach yourself exclusively to the Prophet. That is the right course.²

Similar is it with Shāh Sayyid 'Aḥmad Barelwī.³ He belonged to the school of

¹ Kitāb (کتاب) literally means 'book.' Technically it means the Qur-ān and the injunction of the Qur-ān. Sunnat literally means habit; technically it means the Prophet's mode of habitual actions, or the Prophet's example. Hence Kitāb-o-Sunnat means the injunctions of the Qur-ān and the example of the Prophet.

² IK., p. 87.

³ Shāh Sayyid Aḥmad Barelwī (1201-1246 A.H.). From early childhood he was mystically minded and felt in himself a strong propensity to follow only the Prophet. After some education at Lucknow, he went to Delhi, where he became a disciple of Shāh 'Abdul 'Azīz. However, he broke away from Shāh 'Abdul 'Azīz on the practice of Taṣawwur-i-Shaikh (تصور شیخ), picturing the Shāikh in imagination, which he regarded as idolatry, and pursued his spiritual development single-handed. The progress he made was immense,—indeed Shāh 'Abdul 'Azīz himself wished to become his disciple in the end. Soon his reputation spread far and wide. Mawlā 'Abdul Ḥayy and Shāh Ismā'īl, two eminent relations of Shāh 'Abdul 'Azīz joined him. Thousands of Muslims adopted his views, and he was everywhere hailed as the true *Khalīfa*. One of his biographers, Mawlā 'Abdul Aḥad, asserts that more than 40,000 Hindus and unbelievers became converts to Islām through his preachings. In 1232 A.H. Shāh Sayyid Aḥmad set out from his native

the Mujaddid and has a very high place amongst the mystics of Islām. The Sayyid believed that he had a special affinity to the Prophet and that he got spiritual guidance directly from him or from God.¹ He turns round and sets up a new method, which he

city on a pilgrimage to Mecca, staying a few months at Calcutta on the way. Two years later, on his return to India, he started making active preparation for Jihād or religious war on the Sikhs of the Punjab to rescue the Musalmāns of that province from their tyranny. He made campaign after campaign against the Sikhs and died a martyr fighting at the battle of Balākot in the year 1246 A.H.

¹In mystic terminology to get guidance direct from the spirituality of the Prophet is called Uwaisīyyat (اويسيت). The term comes from Uwais. It is believed that Uwais got spiritual guidance direct from the Holy Prophet, that he could never meet him. The Mujaddid regards himself to be an Uwaisī (اويسی), and it is remarkable that after him a large number of mystics have claimed themselves to be Uwaisīs. In our times too there was a mystic of great eminence, Ḥājī Sayyid Wārith 'Alī Shāh (d. 1321 A.H.), about whom it is said that he received spiritual guidance directly from a'imma'-i-ahl-i-bait (اثمه اهل بيت), the grandsons of the Prophet.

Prof. F. Krenkow doubts the mysterious personality of Uwais-al-Qaranī, which is supposed and claimed as the origination of Sufism, and is convinced that such person never existed in reality. Imām Mālik b. Anas (d. 179 A.H.) is the first

calls, *Ṭarīqa-i-Nabuwwat*¹ or the Prophetical Method. Other methods are according to him only *Ṭarīqahā-i-Wilāyat* or mystical methods.² The peculiarity of the new method is that the mystic should first make all his actions conform strictly to the law given by the Prophet;³ and only then take to '*Dhikr* and *Fikr*', remembrance and contemplation. The *dhikr*⁴

who heard of him and doubted his real existence. The biographies of Uwais are not convincing at all.

¹*Ṭarīqa-i-Nabuwwat* (طريقه نبوت) is that method of spiritual development which aims at developing only those values which the the Holy Prophet aimed at. *Ṭarīqa-i-Wilāyat* (طريقه ولايت) is the method of mystic development, used by mystics of Islām, and aimed at cultivating mystical mode of life. The difference is that of being according to *Shari'at* or indifferent to it.

²SM., p. 8.

³*Ibid.*, p. 144.

⁴*Dhikr* (ذکر) is commemoration. In it *Asmā-o-Ṣifāt*, the names and attributes of God, are recited, which is a help in the progress of the mystic. *Shughl* is the practicing of *dhikr*. *Shughl-i-Nafī* (شغل نفی) is the *dhikr* of لا اله, denial of everything other than God, and *Shughl-i-Ithbāt* (شغل اثبات) is the *dhikr* of لا اله الا الله, the affirmation of God. *Fikr* (فکر) is distinguished from *Murāqiba* (مراقبه). It is in general the

of the method consists in reading the Qur-ān and reciting the prayers which the Prophet used to recite ;¹ while the *fikr* of the method consists in contemplation on the Goodness and Grace of God which is so profusely spread about us, and in making our will wholly subordinate to His Will, and in realising His omnipresence at every moment, etc.² The most beneficial aid to all this, according to this method, is that the mystic should take to the service of his fellow-beings.³ Shāh Sayyid Aḥmad denies pantheism and believes in theism.⁴ He puts *Ṣaḥw* or sobriety above *Sukr* or spiritual intoxication. He preaches *Jihād* or fighting in the way of God in place of *Simā'* (سماع) or music-hearing for the sake of ecstasy, and demands social service instead

contemplation of the *Ṣifāt-i-Ilāhī* (صفات الهی), attributes of Allah. *Murāqiba* is the concentrated contemplation.

¹ SM., pp. 148-149.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 154-157.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 20-24.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.

of solitude. He punctiliously follows Kitāb-o-Sunnat, Qur-ān and the example of the Prophet, and, strenuously and emphatically denounces *bid'āt* or innovations.¹ That is why, he rose, organised the Musalmāns and raised the standard of Jihād or the holy war against the Sikhs who were subjecting Musalmāns in the Punjab to religious persecution. He fought long and fought valiantly and was himself killed in Jihād (1246 A.H.); and with him was killed also Shāh Ismā'il Shahīd who was his chief lieutenant.²

Secondly, the call of the Mujaddid induced theologians, those learned in the religious lore, to turn to the Hadīth. Before the Mujaddid religious learning consisted wholly of jurisprudence or *Fiqh*. But the Mujaddid turned the tide to the *Kitāb-o-Sunnat* or Qur-ān and the Prophet. People started learning the Hadīth or Tradition, and Shāh Walī-Ullah

¹ SM., pp. 45-46.

² SA., pp. 142-150.

established the first school of Ḥadīth in India. With Shāh Sayyid Aḥmad Barelwī the school turned into Ahl-i-Ḥadīth¹ or Traditionists which yet had room for mystic element in it. Later the emphasis fell against *Taqīd* or blind following of the authority of the jurists and there arose *Ghair Muqallidīn* or pure and simple Ahl-i-Ḥadīth or strict traditionists. In this connection we may also speak of the reform and High Criticism inaugurated by Sir Sayyid Aḥmed Khān.² Sir Sayyid emphasised the criticism of the Ḥadīth and forcibly directed attention to the *Kitāb* or the *Qur-ān* as the

¹ *Ahl-i-Ḥadīth* (اهل حديث) : Those who follow only the Ḥadīth or sayings and doings of the Prophet and not the school of Islamic jurists. All great collectors of Ḥadīth really belong to this school of thought. But it became a sect in the hands of 'Abdul Wahhāb of Nejd (d. 1201 A.H.) and took its root in India with the followers of Shāh Sayyid Aḥmad Barelwī (d. 1246 A.H.) and his chief lieutenant Shāh Ismā'īl Shāhīd (d. 1246 A.H.). *Ahl-i-Qur-ān*: Those who follow only the *Qur-ān* and discard the Ḥadīth also along with Fiqh or jurists.

² Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān (1232-1315 A.H.) came of a family connected with the Delhi Court. The fall of the Mughal

real source of Islām. This in the long run gave rise to the sect of the Ahl-i-Qur-ān or Quranists instituted by Mawlwī 'Abdullah.¹

Sir Sayyid was brought up in the school of the Mujaddid. His conception of Tawhīd or divine unity is theistic;² and with reference to mysticism he went further and clearly announced that mysticism is nothing more than a way of purifying the soul and the morals³—something which was implicit in the teachings of the Mujaddid, but which had not come

Empire in 1857 A.D. set him thinking; and he took to the work of the reform of the Musalmāns of India. At last in 1875 A.D. he founded the present Aligarh Muslim University. Sir Sayyid, as he is generally called, has exerted a great formative influence; indeed there is hardly any movement of importance—religious, political, social, educational and literary—amongst the Musalmāns of India which is not directly or indirectly traceable to him.

¹ Mawlwī 'Abdullah Chakrālwi (d. 1334 A.H.). He was a great scholar of the Qur-ān, and in the beginning of the present century of the Christian era founded the sect of Ahl-i-Qur-ān. He maintains that Qur-ān and Qur-ān alone is the genuine source for all Islamic dogmatics; and that neither Qiyās nor Ijmā' nor even Ḥadīth has any authority.

² TfA., Vol. I, p. 156.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 78-91.

to clear consciousness.¹ Later Sir Muḥammad Iqbāl² also protested against Waḥdat-i-Wujūd of the mystics, gave Islamic morality a new spirit and preached life of Effort and Activity.³

Now, Tawhīd is the Problem on which the Mujaddid has deservingly laid the greatest emphasis and made great and original contri-

¹ M., Vol. I, Eps. 207, 217.

² Sir Muḥammad Iqbāl (1294-1357 A.H.) was a great poet, philosopher and scholar. Since he wrote his *Asrār-i-Khudī* about 1333 A.H., he became a force which modified the trend of Muslim thought in politics and morals. He attacked mysticism for its doctrines of 'Fanā' or self-annihilation, and substituted '*Khudī*' or self-affirmation in its place. He also objected to Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism.

³ Cf. Iqbāl's poems *Asrār-i-Khudī* (اسرار خودی) and *Rumūz-i-Bikhudī* (رموز بیخودی).

Asrār-i-Khudī (Secrets of Self): In this Dr. Iqbāl denounces mysticism as un-Islamic in its origin and injurious to the national and political life of Musalmāns.

Rumūz-i-Bikhudī (Secrets of Selflessness): In it he lays emphasis on the life according to the Qur-ān and the Sunnat, and preaches such morals as are more positive.

butions. 'Thereby he has undermined' the whole structure of mysticism in its very foundations, *viz.*, its pantheism. It is this conception in the Mujaddid which I have chosen as the theme of this Dissertation.

The Dissertation is divided into four parts:—

Introduction develops the abstract forms of the Unity of the World-Principle as conceived by the Speculative and the Religious Consciousnesses in their distinctions; and shows how these distinctions tend to be obliterated in Mystic Consciousness.

Chapter I describes the Mujaddid's conception of Tawhīd in contrast to and criticism of Ibn 'Arabī's Pantheistic conception.

Chapter II traces how the conception of the Mujaddid was received amongst the mystics of Islām.

The Conclusion brings out that the pantheistic conception of Tawhīd is a case of the transformation of the religious unity into the

speculative unity, or rather the case of the identification of the two unities; that the Mujaddid's conception of Tawhīd is in consonance with the religious consciousness, and that the attempts made by the successors of the Mujaddid to re-affirm the pantheistic conception of Tawhīd are neither based on direct experience nor are they conclusive as rational arguments.

INTRODUCTION

Unity of the World-Principle

MAN takes different attitudes towards the objects of his experience. These attitudes are called different forms of consciousness. Theoretic consciousness is the attitude which he takes towards the world of objects in order to acquire its knowledge; and epistemology or logic is the science that studies the nature and implications of this consciousness. Moral consciousness is another attitude that man takes—he takes it towards mankind; and ethics or moral philosophy is the science that deals with the laws that arise in this field and the implications thereof. Similarly religious consciousness is the attitude that man takes towards ultimate reality; and ‘theistic’ or

philosophy of religion is the branch of knowledge that studies the nature and implications of this consciousness.

These various forms of consciousness have definite limits, and they are valid only within such limits. But there are cases in which the various forms of consciousness seem to overlap or conflict with each other. It is for philosophy to consider the limits of these various forms with a view to avoid their overlapping and conflict, and to trace the error lying therein. Further it has to determine the exact sense in which each is valid. The unity of the world-principle is a case of this kind. The theoretical and the religious consciousnesses seem to overlap on this point.

The theoretical or the speculative consciousness is, as said above, the knowledge-attitude of man. It has an ideal of knowledge. It yearns to realise that ideal. This ideal consists in having a unified picture of the universe. It consists in finding out a unitary principle, out

of which could spring all the multiplicity of the world—from which the multiplicity could be *deduced*. Such unity has been hovering before the gaze of every metaphysician. The yearning for it is so intense that the speculative consciousness is strongly inclined to go forward and assert the *existence* of this unity; indeed it would go still further and grasp the *essence* of it also. The efforts made in this direction have different forms resulting from the different tendencies of the thinkers who have tried to determine this unity.—The empirically-minded start from the side of the objects of experience, *i.e.*, the multiplicity. They want to seek some empirical object which may be used as a principle of unity forming the basis of all existence. Thales seeks this concrete unity in 'water', which he finds to be the principle of all things; Anaximander finds it in 'matter undetermined'; Anaximenes in 'air'. Democritus finds such a unity in particles of physical things, *i.e.*, 'atoms

and void'. The British school of empiricists finds it in 'ideas and sensations'. Each of them tries to show that the essence of things consists in these entities. Now, these entities, when taken to serve as principles of unity, are really concepts. Each of these attempts is, therefore, an attempt to conceive the unity as a concept from which the multiplicity is deduced. For the unity in each case is not something which exists over and above and beside the multiplicity that is deduced from it, but only as a general idea or concept:—The rationalistically-minded thinkers held that thought and being are essentially one; or that thought is the essence of being. They seek the principle of unity expressly in a concept or a system of concepts from which everything could be deduced logically. Parmenides finds that such a concept is 'Being'; Plato finds it in 'Ideas' or 'Idea of the Good'; Aristotle in pure 'Form'. Spinoza regards 'Substance' to be such a concept, and Hegel

‘Absolute Idea’ which absorbs the whole system of categories in itself. Both these tendencies agree in the assumption that there is some such principle of unity and that things can be deduced from such a principle. But critical philosophy denies that. Kant comes to the conclusion that Unity is only a ‘Regulative Idea’. We cannot affirm its objectivity—we cannot maintain that the principle of the world is one. As a ‘Regulative Idea’, it is only helpful in our attempt to construct a unified system of knowledge; and as such it consists in this that we should go on making attempt after attempt to discover a law from which all other laws could be deduced or expressed as its modes;—though we know that we can never fully succeed in this attempt.

On the other hand a unitary principle is the very mainstay of the religious consciousness. The religious consciousness “is that attitude of man which he takes towards the

Ultimate Reality. But how does religious consciousness conceive this principle? Now, what is the religious situation? Man finds himself confronted in his course with insurmountable obstacles. On the one side stands he with his innate yearning after harmony with reality, after moral perfection and happiness, after knowledge and after beauty. On the other stands the universe, stupendous, dark and brutal, full of sin and ugliness, unamenable to harmony with his moral and spiritual yearnings, and unwilling to accede to the demands of his soul. He finds himself helpless—forlorn. There must be a Being who has the power, as well as the will, to help him, if he is to be rescued. Hence it is that religious consciousness affirms the existence of such a Being. He can help him in his natural wants and can guide him to the right path. He is Rabb or the Providence, and Razzāq or the Sustainer; and He is Raḥmān or the Beneficent, for He accedes

to his natural wants. He is Hādī or the Guide, for He guides him to the right course; and He is Ghāfūr-ur-Raḥīm or the Pardoner and the Merciful, Who can give him relief—relief from the unbearable burden of his sins and sinful nature. But He can truly help him only if He knows all facts open or hidden, past or future. Therefore He is Samī'um-Baṣīr or the Hearer and the Seer, and 'Ālim-ul-ghaib wash-shahāda or the Omniscient. Further He must have power to do all He likes;—He is Qādir or the Powerful and Fa'āl-ul limā-yurīd the Accomplisher of all He might wish: the Omnipotent. But such power He can have only if He is the Creator¹ of the world and man. Therefore He is

¹ Because if things exist or have come into existence independently of His Will, a limit is set thereby to His Power by their nature; His control over them and over the events of the universe does not remain complete. He thereby ceases to perform the function for the sake of which His existence was postulated. That is, He cannot satisfy the religious consciousness unless He is also the Creator, Khāliq (خالق) and Bārī (باری).

Khāliq and Bārī or the Creator. Moreover He must have the supreme will to lead him to perfection;—He is Dhul-faḍl il-‘aẓīm, the most Gracious. He must consequently Himself be perfectly Good,—He is Quddūs or the Holy. His help is grace. Man cannot claim it as his right. When man realises his own helplessness and the power of this Being, he is filled with awe and devotion, and beseeches Him for help and guidance. He is Ma‘būd or the Object of worship, and Mujīb-ud-da‘wāt or the Answerer of human prayers. The further implication that dawns on Religious Consciousness, in view of the supremacy of this Being and the exclusiveness of the right of devotion to Him, is that He is One,—He is Aḥad or the One, and Ṣamad or the Self-sufficient who needs nothing and to whom recourse is had in every need. These are the attributes of the Unity which religious consciousness affirms in *relation to us*, and which we understand and know. But *in Him*—

self—in His entirety and His essence, we do not know Him: *ما يحيطون به علما*—by cognition they cannot comprehend Him; nor can we comprehend Him by analogy, for in His essence nothing is like unto Him: *ليس كمثله شئ*—there is nothing like unto Him. With this much of positive and negative knowledge of Him the religious consciousness is satisfied.

Now, it is of paramount importance to realise the inherent differences between these two unities—the speculative and the religious. In the nature of the case it would appear that:—

Firstly, the speculative unity is *unqualitative*, while the religious unity must necessarily be *qualitative*, i.e., of a certain nature. The empirically-minded thinkers sought the principle of unity in “water”, in “matter undetermined”, in “air”, in “atoms”, in “ideas”, in “sensations”,—in some existent entity. The rationalists found it in “Being”, in “Idea of the Good”, in “Form”, in “Substance”, in

“Absolute Idea”,—in some concept. The critical philosopher sought it in ‘Abstract Law’. This shows that the speculative consciousness is really indifferent to the nature of the unity. It is satisfied if the ideal of unified knowledge is realised. It is all the same to it whether the unity is water or air, atom or idea, matter or mind, conscious or unconscious, mechanical or teleological. It may be of any quality whatsoever, or it may be even qualityless. The only quality it should possess is that it should be such that from it the multiplicity could be logically deduced,—The speculative consciousness is not even keen that it should be numerically one. It may be one in number or it may be many.

But the religious consciousness is in dead earnest exactly with regard to the nature of the unity. The unity must be Rabb and Razzāq,—Providence and Sustainer, and it must be Raḥmān or Beneficent; further it must be Ghafūr-ur-Raḥīm or the Pardoner

and the Merciful, and it must be Hādī or Guide. Moreover, it must be 'Ālim-ul-ghaib wash-shahāda or the Knower of the Open and the Hidden, and it must be Fa"āl-ul-limā-yurīd or the Doer of whatever He chooses to do. It must further be Khāliq and Bārī or the Creator of the Universe,¹ and Quddūs or the Holy, and Dhul Faḍl or the Gracious. And more, it must have the exclusive right of devotion to itself from man, i.e., it must be the only Ma'būd or the Object of worship; and it must be one—numerically one or Aḥad. Indeed, the religious consciousness is so keen

¹ *Creation* means bringing something into being out of complete nothing. This conception, however, is a stumbling block for the speculative consciousness, because such a coming into being is absolutely inconceivable. The speculative consciousness, therefore, must stop in its logical regress at some being or Wujūd, from which it could, by modification, deduce the actual world order. It cannot conceive that a substance can come into being *ab novo*. About accidents or equalities of the substance it does not seem to be so sceptical,—new qualities do come into being as a matter of fact. But in its purity—in its rigour, the speculative consciousness does yearn to deduce even qualities from the primordial essence of the substance (cf. Scientific Materialism).

on the nature of the unity that it yearns even for the oneness of the unity only because of its attributes. It is rather the attributes that demand that the unity in question should be numerically one, for then and then alone can it give the satisfaction for which it has been postulated.

Secondly, the speculative unity must naturally be *immanent* while on the contrary the religious unity must be *transcendent*. That the speculative unity is immanent means that it does not exist over and above the multiplicity but only in multiplicity—which indeed is only a form and modification of it. Empirically conceived, the unity is some existential being, e.g., 'water', 'air', 'matter undetermined', 'atom'. The unity here is really only of concept. It does not exist over and above existing things. It is wholly exhausted in its denotation. Rationalistically conceived, it is evidently an abstract concept, e.g., the 'Being' of Parmenides. It has only conceptual

being: it has no existence of its own. It becomes fact only in things, because they are conceived as its instances. Even critically conceived, the unity is only a conceptual principle, a law. As such it is abstract; it has no being of its own, and it exists only in its applications. Thus the speculative form of unity in all its three kinds is such that it is nothing other than the unity of an abstract concept;—in no case it is the unity of an existent being. The concept however either has no being at all, *i.e.*, in the sense of existence; or if it has one, it is exhausted in the being of the instances to which it applies. Thus the speculative unity, if it exists at all, is necessarily immanent.

On the contrary the religious unity must be transcendent. It must necessarily be over and above the world and man. It must be wholly an *other*. Because the despair of man amidst the obstacles that originate in his own nature and those that originate in the nature

of the world around him, demands that help should come from a source which is other than the sources of his troubles, and which has full control over the whole world of men and things. Indeed this succour from the source over and above the world is the very purpose for which religious consciousness postulates the existence of such a Being. That is why religious unity is necessarily transcendent.

Thirdly, the speculative unity is necessarily *monistic*, while the religious unity is *dualistic*. In connection with immanence and transcendence it has in general been brought out above that the speculative unity has no being over and above the multiplicity. This is monism ; for it means that the one and the many have no separate existences. But it means more ; it means that only the one exists, and that the many have no existence by the side of the one. Now the speculative unity is of this nature ; for speculative consciousness is out to con-

ceive the world as one or as differentiation of the one. So far it is qualitative monism. But at a certain stage speculative consciousness is not satisfied with mere qualitative monism ; it will also be quantitative monism,—the Real is one, single, individual ;—it is *numerically* one. At that stage the unity is conceived either as a whole, or as a substance or as a spirit. But the whole, one single, individual, does not exist over and above the parts,—it is only the organisation of the parts and is incapable of existing in its own right. The position remains that of mere immanence. The unity is consequently raised to the dignity of a substance. Now the many become only modes of the substance, its manifestations, its adjectives ; they have no being of their own. When the unity is conceived, not merely as substance but as spirit, it is an Infinite Spirit ; and finite spirits are conceived as numerically identical with it. They have no being of their own ; while the material

world is conceived either as expressly unreal, or together with the finite spirits as a reproduction or re-realisation of the Infinite Spirit itself.¹

But the religious unity must needs be dualistic. For the situation, that has given rise to the postulating of the existence of a Divine Being, is that man is disappointed with his own self and the nature of the world. Neither of them is capable of according any help to him in his distress. He postulates the existence of a spiritual Being. To be in harmony with Him alone would enable him to realise his yearnings. This implies that God on the one side, and the universe and man on the other, must be fundamentally different in nature. One is perfect, the other imperfect.

¹ It may, by the way, be remarked here that in putting the emphasis on the reality of the one,—on its self existence and its supreme value, already the influence of the religious consciousness is present; and where it leads further to the apparent affirmation of the many as existent, as in Plato or Green, the affirmation is made most grudgingly and the point is left obscure.

Both exist—they exist side by side. One is other than the other. On the contrary, if religious unity were a whole, it would only be an aspect or relation of the manifold; it would not exist in its own right,—only the manifold would; and if it were substance or spirit, the world and man would only be immanent expressions of and hence essentially, identical with it,—there would be no room for man as a separate existent and hence for the specific religious yearnings; for its object would be already a realised fact or will necessarily be realised without any ado and any kind of external help. In that case there need indeed be no religion or religious yearning. That is why the religious consciousness cannot afford to be monistic; it must be dualistic,—it must assert the existence of the imperfect on one side and that of the Perfect on the other. It cannot permit the evaporation of the one, or of the other.

Fourthly, the religious unity must be

Personal, while speculative unity need not be personal,—indeed it tends to be *Impersonal*.

Personality implies consciousness; nay it implies more, it implies *self-consciousness*, consciousness of itself as over and above—as other than something else, *i.e.* as transcending them. But we can conceive a being who is self-conscious, and yet it will hardly deserve the name of personality unless it can determine its own action according to the principles of morality, *i.e.*, unless it is *free*. Again, such a being may be just—absolutely just; it may be holy. But that is not enough; it would then be only the doctrine of “Karma” hypostatized. We want more. It should be capable not only of justice but also of *grace*. It is grace which forms the distinctive feature of personality. A man who always gives you but your deserts, neither more nor less, will be regarded by you as lacking in personal elements. Now, the religious consciousness seeks a unity which is eminently personal. It seeks that

the 'Divine Being should be aware of my actual condition ; and that it should be aware of my yearnings ; more, it should have grace—it should be capable of satisfying my yearnings in spite of my shortcomings—in spite of my failure to deserve what I yearn for. That is to say, the religious unity must be fully personal.

Not so the speculative consciousness. It is not interested in personality. It wants only a unity ; whether it is personal or impersonal is immaterial to it. As brought out above in discussing immanence and transcendence, as well as monism and dualism, speculative consciousness has conceived its unity pre-eminently as impersonal. So long as the unity is only a qualitative one, the issue is clear. But when it becomes a quantitative unity—the whole, the substance, the spirit, even there the speculative consciousness is not inclined to conceive the unity as personal. As a whole, it may be any kind of whole ; as a substance again it may

be any kind of substance. Indeed, as such, it is, as in Spinoza and Schelling, something other than self-conscious. Only as spirit it looks like a person. Here it is the religious interest that is at work. However, the attributing of a kind of transcendence to that spirit turns out to be nominal; it loses itself in the demand, inherent in speculative consciousness, for immanence. The spirit is not other than anything else, or no-being is other than the spirit. This makes self-consciousness doubtful; hence the idealist is strongly inclined to refuse personality to it. Moreover the speculative consciousness is loath to ascribe freedom to it, or it would interpret freedom as identical with necessity; for necessity alone satisfies the demand of the speculative consciousness;—indeed it yearns for unity and necessity. With necessity there hardly remains any room for grace. Thus all the elements of personality are jeopardised by the requirements of the speculative consciousness.

Fifthly, the religious unity must be *Free*—absolutely free, and it must admit of moral freedom for man ; while the speculative unity need neither be itself free nor need it admit of the freedom of man.

Freedom means, positively, the possession of inherent independence in the object called free to determine the mode of its activity ; and negatively, the absence of any kind of external restraint or internal constraint on its action.—Religious consciousness conceives the unity as a perfect Being. It must therefore be morally perfect, have grace, and be self-sufficient. Now, morality necessarily involves freedom ; the Divine Being, if He is morally perfect, must be fully free. Further if He is to have grace, which is so inevitably demanded by religious consciousness, He must have freedom ; otherwise, if grace in its various forms, *viz.*, beneficence, sustenance, guidance, mercy, forgiveness and reward, is a necessity of His nature, then it will come to

us without yearning for it ;—and more, it will hardly deserve the name of grace, for it will be from the moral standpoint of a lower kind than the grace which even man is capable of showing. Moreover, freedom is a requirement of His *Ṣamadiyyat* or Self-sufficiency. He does not *need* anything; not even the exhibition of any kind of attitude or action towards other beings. What He does for man is, therefore, absolutely unselfish, and hence absolutely free. And there is room for the freedom of man also, for man must be free, if he is created by Him to yearn for moral perfection and to seek His grace.

The speculative consciousness, on the contrary, yearns exactly for *necessity*,—it would have a unity from which all multiplicity could be deduced rigorously. Hence there can be no freedom in its unity, nor in the multiplicity which proceeds from it. When the speculative consciousness conceived the unity as existent object, *e.g.*, in materialism, etc., the

unity is conceived as a cause, from which the whole world process originates and proceeds on the principle of mechanical causality. When it conceives the unity as a rational concept, e.g., the monism of Spinoza, the principle on which it acts and on which the multiplicity is derived from it is the principle of logical ground-consequence. When the speculative consciousness seems to go further and conceive the unity as a spirit, it has then the appearance of affirming freedom in the unity as well as in man. But then what is really meant is only the want of external constraint; and freedom is identified with internal necessity,—which in truth is no freedom.

Sixthly, *Immortality* is another point which is bound up for the religious consciousness with its unity, but which is hardly of any consequence from the standpoint of the speculative unity.

The religious consciousness yearns for per-

fection—perfection which is wanting in man, and which to all appearances cannot be attained by him in this short span of life; nor by his own endeavours, unless the whole system of reality is somehow transformed into a new order. It is for this reason that immortality as well as the existence of Divine Being is postulated by it. The two are really two phases of one and the same postulate,—the former is the subjective condition and the latter the objective condition of one and the same requirement.

But for the speculative consciousness both these conditions are unnecessary. It neither cares for a definite qualitative nature of the unity, nor consequently for the survival of human soul after death. This because it is not the interest of the speculative consciousness that the multiplicity, or indeed that the unity, should have a particular nature. Its problem is to find out the unity from which the multiplicity as such could necessarily be

deduced. Hence it is that all the attempts to determine the speculative unity and trace the growth of multiplicity from it are indifferent as to the immortality of the human soul. They are not only indifferent as to the immortality of the human soul, they rather strongly tend to deny it. If the unity is only qualitative one, then too the soul is a transitory mode of the substance. Its being is in every case adjectival. Even when it seems to attain to self-subsistence, as in idealism, its survival after death is the survival of its memory (or idea) in God or the survival of the element common to all the souls, *i.e.*, their general idea;—in every case it is re-absorbed in God.

Seventhly, the speculative unity must be absolutely *knowable*, while the religious unity need *not be knowable* at all.

The speculative unity has its origin in the yearning to *know* reality. The speculative consciousness is knowledge consciousness. It

assumes that reality is essentially knowable by us. Hence when the empirically-minded comes to the task of metaphysics, he grasps reality as fundamentally matter, material, physical,—as the direct object of immediate perception; or as sensations and ideas, psychological, mental,—again as something which is directly apprehended in introspection. The world-picture that is thereby constructed is materialism or subjective idealism.

While if the task is undertaken by the rationalistically-minded, the world is grasped as a system of concepts or categories,—of that which is the proper object of thought and can be grasped by the intellect without remainder. The world-picture thus produced is idealism, etc. But if the attempt were to be made critically, *i.e.*, on the principle of Kant, the unity shall have to be conceived as that of a Law from which all other laws could be rigorously derived,—law which is again an abstract object and is fully grasped by thought. However,

for Kant it is only a regulative idea and has no objectivity. Thus we see that it makes no difference what kind of unity is taken as the unity of the world by the speculative consciousness, it is through and through known and knowable.

But the religious unity need be only partly knowable ; it need not be wholly knowable,—indeed it is not wholly knowable, because the demand for it arises in the need of man for a being who could protect and guide and help him in the world-situation in which he finds himself. The unity must therefore have the attributes requisite for the purpose. But they constitute the nature of the unity with regard to—*in relation with* him. They are neither all the attributes, nor need they necessarily define the absolute nature of the unity. And the humility incident to the attitude towards the unity and the immense grandeur of the unity necessarily lead man to maintain that it surpasses the grasp of his tiny faculties and is

essentially incomprehensible by him. He has to confess that لا يعلمه الا هو —no one knows him but He Himself and ما يحيطون به علما —by cognition they cannot comprehend him. Indeed the religious consciousness in its highest form, viz., revelation seems to hold that the unity is not knowable, even in relation to us, at all, that it is knowable neither in its existence, nor even with regard to its attributes in relation to us; for its existence and its attributes are beyond experience, only it is convinced of and hence *believes* in the existence of the unity, and in such attributes of it as necessitated the postulate of its existence;—there is no question of knowledge.

Eighthly, each of these unities engenders a different mode of life. The speculative consciousness breeds *contemplation*, meditation, quietude; while the religious consciousness arouses yearning, struggle, *activity*.

The speculative unity, once grasped, brings all activity to end. For if the unity is grasped

as perfect, the highest activity becomes the timeless activity of thought which is "dialectic" for Plato, and "theoria" for Aristotle:— and human beings become perfect with the perfection of God—the unity of which they are modes (Spinoza); and hence there remains no room for activity. But if the unity is conceived as imperfect, there arise two alternatives. In one case, it would be once for all imperfect and determined by its inner necessity; and hence all exertion to make it perfect would be futile. In the other, that is if the unity involves progress towards perfection, it would of necessity grow perfect and no activity on the part of us human beings is required for its perfection.—In its very nature the speculative consciousness in knowledge-consciousness. And knowledge in itself produces contemplation and not activity.

But it is quite the other way about with the religious unity. The need of the religious unity has arisen in man from the situation that

there are many yearnings in his soul, and the world around him as well as his own nature raises insuperable obstacles in his way to their realisation. The help and guidance from the religious unity, *i.e.*, God, require and inspire him to active struggle against these obstacles. The struggle aims at bringing his own nature in harmony with the Divine Will, and in bringing the whole order of the world too in harmony with His Will. This struggle to create the subjective and objective harmony is not the means to the realisation of these yearnings; rather the struggle itself is the gradual realisation of them. The task is so gigantic that it must continue till the end of the world, and requires enormous and incessant work.—Indeed the religious consciousness is *yearning*—it is yearning to become something, to get to something, to *bring about* something; it is practical consciousness and must needs generate *activity*.

These distinctions between the speculative

and the religious unities are of paramount importance. They must not be obliterated.

Now pantheism, the doctrine of Islamic mystics called *Wahdat-i-Wujūd*, seems exactly to do this;—it obliterates these distinctions. It seems to identify the religious unity with the speculative unity. The confusion of these two very distinct unities is not confined to mystics only; it is found also in philosophers. There seems to be an urge in human nature to make of these two one unity. What happens is this. The two unities lie latent in the consciousness of the subject, the thinker or the mystic. Both are descriptions of ultimate reality. The primary approach to it is either through the medium of thought or that of intuition,—to the speculative unity or to the religious unity. If to the former, the attributes of the religious unity are unawares attached to it, if to the latter, those of the speculative unity. Thus are the 'Substance' of Spinoza and the 'Idea' of Hegel endowed

with Divine attributes ; and thus are the Deity of Plotin^{us} and God of Jāmī deduced from the conception of pure Being.

More particularly what seems to happen in the case of a Muslim mystic is this. To begin with, he is a Muslim. He believes in God, he believes in His attributes, and he believes in his own responsibility and in life-after-death ;—indeed he believes in all that has been given to him by the religious consciousness as it manifested itself in Muhammad. Then there happens to arise a yearning in his soul,—the transcendental yearning of Kant, to *know* God. Ordinary experience palpably has no place here. He is led to believe that there is a new kind of experience,—a transcendental experience which can be acquired. That is, there is something called “Kashf-o-Shuhūd” by which one can know God. He takes to it. He now *knows* ;—he *realises* God and he realises His nature. The reason that he now uses in this connection too is Kashf-

o-Shuhūd; it is spiritual reason. Thus both the elements of knowledge, viz., experience and reason get to their rights;—only they are transcendental. In this way the Islamic mystic passes over to the speculative consciousness—to *knowledge consciousness*. All the inherent requirements of the speculative consciousness must now be fulfilled; God must be grasped now as the speculative unity. The mystic knows that He is knowable, that He is immanent, that He is the only existent, etc. The attributes, which he formerly believed in, remain confusedly tacked on to his newly-attained knowledge. Sometimes the mystic himself remains unaware of the confusion; sometimes he becomes aware of it, and either throws such attributes overboard in favour of the speculative attributes, or permits the confusion to remain for fear of dire consequences to himself or to the vulgar who would lose all if they were told what the truth is.

But what the Islamic mystics consciously held is this: Mysticism is an attempt to have a firsthand experience of what the Prophet of Islam is supposed to have experienced. The Islamic mystic believes that the Prophet experienced God and Eternity. The mystic is out to experience them himself. He adopts certain practices called "Mujāhida" or spiritual exercises. On his way he believes he acquires certain occult powers to work Karāmāt, miracles. With these we are not concerned. However it must be borne in mind that in all this he tries to keep to Islam and its spirit. What interests us is the third element of mysticism, viz. "Kashf-o-Ilhām" or intuition of God and Eternity. The mystic believes that he comes to apprehend eternal verities and God directly. This is what is also known as religious experience. The subject comes, so to say, in direct contact with Divine Being. He has immediate vision of God. The result is "Ḥaqq-ul-

Yaqīn"—¹ the infallible certainty of His existence and His essence. The competence and validity of *Kashf-o-Ilhām* as the faculty cognisant of Divine Being is assumed without question; and it is maintained that *Kashf* is qualitatively different from reason. It is the direct apprehension of ultimate Reality.

Now it must be borne in mind that on the principles of Islamic mysticism the reliability of *Kashf* is to be measured by the criterion of the spiritual experience of the Prophet of God; for that was the highest and the truest experience. This gives us a standard, so to say,—an internal evidence of the truth or

¹ *Haqq-ul-Yaqīn* (حق اليقين) : Literally absolute certainty. Yaqīn or certainty according to mystics has three stages; '*ilm-ul-yaqīn*', '*ain-ul-yaqīn*', '*haqq-ul-yaqīn*'. One finds smoke and is certain that there is fire, this is '*ilm-ul-yaqīn*', one sees fire with his own eyes, he is more sure than the first person of the existence of fire, this is '*ain-ul-yaqīn*' one puts his hand in fire and gets a burn, he realises the existence of fire, this is '*haqq-ul-yaqīn*'. With reference to the Being of Allāh, the mystics believe that one passes through similar stages of certainty and realisation. But on the principle of the Mujaddid none of these kinds of *yaqīn* is possible in case of the Being of God.

otherwise of the findings of a mystic.

Throwing a glance on the history and development of pantheism or *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd* in Islamic mysticism, we find that before Ibn 'Arabī and Ḥakīm-i-Ishrāq,¹ there are to be found only accidental utterances of sundry mystics purporting to pantheism. For example Bāyazīd Bustāmī (d. 261 A.H.) is said to have exclaimed, سُبْحَانِي مَا عَظُم شَانِي—Holy am I, how great is my Glory; and Maṣṣūr (d. 309 A.H.) اَنَا الْحَق—I am the Truth; the implication thereof being that the relation between me and Him is that of identity. It was Ibn 'Arabī who seems to have been the first to interpret his own mystic experience of *Tawḥīd*, or unity in such a way as to be intelligible to others, and to have strenuously maintained that *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd* is the very essence of Islam. And Ibn 'Arabī tried to support his interpretation with verses of the *Qur-ān* and the sayings of the

¹ Shaikh Shahāb'uddīn Suharwardī, the author of *Ḥikmat-ul-Ishrāq*, (d. 578 A.H.).

Holy Prophet. Ibn 'Arabī has had enormous influence on mystic thought in Islam. Consequently Ibn Taimiyya had to write a treatise, "فى ابطال وحدت الوجود"—Refutation of Pantheism—in which he strongly criticised Ibn 'Arabī's conception of Tawhīd and its implications. But perhaps Ibn Taimiyya's criticism was too early. At least it had little influence in the Islamic East. Ibn 'Arabī had not yet come to sway the Islamic soul. It was later that his sway became complete. Practically everyone accepted Waḥdat-i-Wujūd and held it on the basis of mystic experience.¹

It was at this stage that the Mujaddid appeared. He found Waḥdat-i-Wujūd ram-

¹ Ibn Taimiyya (661-728 A.H.) and Imām Dhahabī (d. 748 A.H.) as theologians strongly opposed Ibn 'Arabī. Dr. F. Krenkow has kindly enlightened me on the point. He writes: "In Syria and Egypt was a similar struggle against sufi Pantheism waged by Ibn Taimiyya and the historian and Muḥaddith Dhahabī. In the eighth century the adherents of Sufism were found in Egypt and Syria only among emigrants from Persia and India. I fear they had a bad time. A Khānqāh in Cairo, Sa'id-as-Su'adā', generally harboured them."

pant. He himself went through it in his mystic development. And the real point of interest is that he throws it overboard as a mystic, *i.e.*, exactly on the ground of his own advanced *mystic experience*; and he seems to have liberated the religious unity from its complication with 'the speculative' unity on that very ground. And his findings apparently bear the test, the criterion of the reliability of mystic experience, namely, it coalesces with the findings of the religious experience of the Prophet as generally formulated by Muslim divines!

Describing his internal history, the Mujaddid writes that at first he only believed in *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd*; for from early childhood he knew it on rational grounds and was thoroughly convinced of its truth. But when he entered mysticism, it was then that he first realised *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd* as a spiritual experience and came to know it first-hand. Long did he remain in that *maqām* or stage;

and all knowledge that is incident to that stage was granted to him.¹

Afterwards a new kind of spiritual experience took hold of his soul, and he found that he could hold *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd* no longer. Yet he hesitated to give expression to his new experience, because he had cherished *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd* so long. At last he had to reject it definitely, and it was revealed to him that *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd* was a lower stage, and that he had arrived at a higher stage, viz., *Zilliyyat* or adumbration. His rejection was now something which he could no longer help, though he was really unwilling to reject it because of the respect for the great leaders of mysticism who all had held it. However, he yearned to continue at the stage of *Zilliyyat* or adumbration for *Zilliyyat* or adumbration has a kinship with *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd*. In it he experienced himself and the world as the *zill* or shadow of

¹ M., Vol. I, Ep. 31.

God. But the grace of God took him higher up to the highest stage, viz. 'Abdiyyat or servitude. Then did he realise that 'Abdiyyat or servitude is very high above all other stages; and he repented having yearned to stick to Wahdat-i-Wujūd and Zilliyyat¹ or adumbration.

Naturally enough, one expects that those of the Muslim mystics who have chosen to differ with the Mujaddid and have gone back to Ibn 'Arabī and his Wahdat-i-Wujūd, for example Shāh Walī-Ullah, should primarily contest the position of the Mujaddid on the basis of mystic experience, and not merely on rationalistic or logical grounds,—that they should base their case on the religious consciousness and not on the speculative consciousness.

With these introductory remarks, let us proceed to discuss the position of the Mujaddid in detail.

¹ M., Vol. I, Ep. 160.

CHAPTER I

The Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhīd

TAWHĪD literally means oneness. But in Islam, the term denotes the religious unity. As we have seen, the religious unity must be numerically one, and unique in the possession of all the attributes of perfection. This is Tawhīd.

The conception of Tawhīd as developed by the Mujaddid has historically arisen in his mind in close contrast with—indeed as a protest against Wahdat-i-Wujūd or the unityism. He takes Ibn ‘Arabī in particular for criticism, because Ibn ‘Arabī is the great mystic who, for the depth of his insight and comprehensiveness of his argumentation, may well be called the ‘Imām’ or the Leader of pan-

theistic mystics in Islam; indeed he is actually called Shāikh-i-Akbar or the greatest Shāikh. It is consequently necessary to give a brief exposition of Ibn 'Arabī's conception of Tawhīd and the Mujaddid's criticism.

I.—*Ibn 'Arabī's Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or Unityism and the Mujaddid's Criticism of it*

IBN 'ARABĪ'S position with regard to Tawhīd is that Being is one,—it is that which exists. This Being is Allah. Everything else is His manifestation. Hence the world is identical with Allah. The identity of the world and Allah is conceived on the basis of the identity of His Dhāt-o-Sifāt¹ or existence and

¹ The distinction of Dhāt (ذات) and Sifāt (صفات) is very nearly the distinction of substance and attributes. At times it looks like that of existence and essence. It can be rendered as the distinction of Being and Nature, or It and Its Qualities. Asmā' (أسماء) plural of Isma, means Divine Names with reference to particular Sifāt or Dhāt as they occur in the Qur-ān, e.g.,

essence—substance and attribute; the world being only a Tajallī¹ or manifestation of His *Ṣifāt*² or attributes. In other words, the creation of the world is a form of emanation.³ The theory of emanation as held by Ibn 'Arabī and especially as elaborated by his followers as well as the later mystics, e.g., Jāmī, is this.

Raḥīm (رحيم), the Merciful, as they are the names of Allah in virtue of His qualities or activities, i.e., an *Ism* combines *Dhāt* and *Ṣifāt*.

¹ *Tajallī* (تجلی) is really shining forth. The conception underlying it is that God is Light and this Light shines forth as if bodily in many forms. Hence it may be translated as irradiation, effluence, emanation, manifestation and in philosophical terminology is equivalent to Mode. When the Light shines forth on itself it is *Tajallī-bi-nafsihī* (تجلی بنفسه). As the Light shines forth in various grades to the mystic it is *Tajallī-i-Dhātī* or *Ṣifātī*, etc.; with reference to the mystic it means the vision of the Light or illumination by it. If this vision is that of the attributes of God it is *Tajallī-i-Ṣifātī* (تجلی صفاتی), if it is the vision of the Being or *Dhāt* of Allah it is *Tajallī-i-Dhātī* (تجلی ذاتی).

² ShF., p. 8, lines 15-21, and p. 9, lines 6, 11, 15, 16, 21.

³ The act of creation by the word کن ("Be") is nothing but the descent of the Creator Himself into the being of things. See ShF., p. 178, lines 25-27; p. 183, lines 10, 11; p. 213, lines 11-12; p. 152, lines 11-16; p. 253, line 22.

The Being is indeterminate; it is the stage of Lā-ta'ayyun or Indeterminateness of the unity. In its Descent or Determination it passes through five stages. The first two are 'Ilmī or Cognitive and the last three are Khārijī or Existential. In the first descent, the unity becomes conscious of itself as pure being, and the consciousness of Şifāt is only Ijmālī, i.e., general,—it is implicit. In the second descent, the unity becomes conscious of itself as possessing the attributes; that is the stage of Şifāt-i-tafşīlī, i.e., attributes in detail,—it is explicit. These two descents seem to be conceived as conceptual or logical rather than actual; for they are out of time, and the distinction of Dhāt and Şifāt or its attributes is only Dhahnī or logical.—Then begin the real actual descents. The third descent therefore is Ta'ayyun-i-rūhī or the determination as spirit or spirits; the unity has broken itself up into so many spirits, e.g., angels. The fourth of its descents is Ta'ayyun-i-mithālī or

ideal determination, thereby the world of Ideas comes into being. And the fifth descent is Ta'ayyun-i-jasādī or physical determination; it yields the phenomenal or physical beings.¹ These stages are only gradual realisations of the capacities that were already latent in the attributes.

This brings out that for Ibn 'Arabī Dhāt or Being is identical with Ṣifāt or attributes, and Ṣifāt express themselves in tajalliyyāt, i.e. manifestations or modes which are the world and its objects. This same identity of divine modes with His attributes, and of attributes with his Being, is brought out in another way. Ibn 'Arabī maintains that Asmā'-i-Ilāhī or Divine Names are identical with the Musammā or the Named, and the Musammā is the very being of Allah;² and that the Divine Names, although they are many, denote the same

¹ M., Vol. II, E. 1.

² ShF., p. 143—text of FH.

entity;¹ and that whatever is denoted by each name separately is denoted by all of them together. God can be praised with any name or with all the names together, because all the names denote the same being.² Just as He is manifold as regards His Names, and One as regards His Being, so He is Aḥadiyyat-i-Ma'qūla³ like Hayūlā⁴ or 'matter' or a conceptual unity as regards His being, and manifold as regards His existence, because the created beings are nothing but He himself in self-emanation.⁵ Now this identification of Asma' or names and Musammā the named is only another name for the identification of Dhāt and Ṣifāt, i.e., Being and Attributes,

¹ ShF., p. 223—text of FH.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 226-227.

³ Aḥadiyyat (احديت) is the quality of being one; it is a stage in mystic journey where the mystic turns away from multiplicity and sees only unity. Aḥadiyyat-i-Ma'qūla (احديت معقوله) means conceptual unity—unity which is conceptually grasped.

⁴ Hayūlā (هيولى) is 'Matter' in the Aristotelean sense, which has Ṣūrat (صورت) or 'Form' as its correlative.

⁵ ShF., p. 253—text of FH.

because 'Ism' or name is nothing but the description of the object in virtue of an attribute of the being.

As to the relation between the world and God, Ibn 'Arabī holds that it is one of identity. In bringing out this identification he proceeds either from the negation of the world or from the affirmation of God. Proceeding from the negation of the world, Ibn 'Arabī holds that the world as such is merely nominal, unreal, imaginary, objectively non-existent,¹ and that God alone exists. The world or multiplicity exists only as the modes of the unity—as His modes; it has no existence of its own: ²الاعيان ماشئت راثكة من الوجود

¹ ShF., p. 117, lines 3-5—text of FH.

² Ā'yān (اعيان) is plural of 'Ain (عين). It means essence in the terminology of Ibn 'Arabī. But essence can be conceived in two ways; either as the *concept* of the nature of a thing or as the *nature* of a thing itself. The latter is something which exists, and may rightly be called the existent nature of the thing. It is in this sense that Ibn 'Arabī uses the term Ā'yān. Ibn 'Arabī calls it Ā'yān-uth-Thābita (اعيان الثابتة). They are Thābita because they are posited as existent; they are therefore existent essences.

the essences which are existent nature of things have not got the slightest touch of reality about them.¹ Proceeding from the side of God, Ibn 'Arabī maintains that the world is God; it is the modes in which the unity has differentiated itself; these modes exhaust the unity wholly; the unity has no existence over and above them : ما بعد هذا إلا لعدم المحض—there is absolute nothingness beyond these modes; and the mystic should not take the trouble of seeking God beyond this world.²

But this experience of identity is not a permanent experience. Hence Ibn 'Arabī comes to speak of a new experience called Farq-ba'd-al-jam'³ (difference-after-Identity).⁴

¹ ShF., p. 63, lines 14-15.

² *Ibid.*, p. 33, line 17.

³ Farq (فرق) literally means difference; in mystic terminology it signifies the state of mind in which the mystic feels the sense of being other than God and separate from Him.—Jam' (جمع) means coming together; in mystic terminology it signifies the state of mind in which the mystic feels one with God. Farq-ba'd-al-Jam' (فرق بعد الجمع) means separateness after unification; in mystic terminology it is the state of mind in which the mystic has outgrown the stage of Jam' and feels himself other than God.

⁴ ShF., p. 91, line 24.

One may call that which really exists God, or one may call it the world, or one may express his inability to differentiate between the two.¹ It remains one and the same. Again, Ibn 'Arabī denies transcendence, and he denies immanence, because these conceptions imply duality of existent. He puts it thus: if God is posited either as transcendent or as immanent His infinitude would be lost. Hence Tawhīd should be affirmed with 'Tanzīh' and 'Tashbīh',² i.e., with transcendence and immanence both.³ Again, according to Ibn 'Arabī Allah is *Aṣl* or the Thing and the world is His *Zill*⁴ or adumbration. But *zill* or adumbration

¹ ShF., p. 134, lines 22-23; p. 147, lines 10-11.

² *Tashbīh* (تشبيہ) literally means likeness. In theology it means attributing likeness of Creatures, i.e., the qualities of the creatures to the Creator. Ibn 'Arabī takes likeness to be identity and hence *Tashbīh* comes to mean immanence.—*Tanzīh* (تنزيہ) literally means to purify. In theology it signifies that the attributes of creatures cannot be ascribed to God. In Ibn 'Arabī it comes to mean transcendence.

³ ShF., p. 45, line 12—text of FH.; p. 48, line 31.

⁴ *Aṣl-o-Zill* (أصل وظل) means the Thing and its Adumbration or shadow. In Ibn 'Arabī *zill* seems to be used as equivalent

tion is the appearance of aṣl or the thing ; it is aṣl appearing, manifesting itself. Hence the world is identical with Allah.¹

As to the relation between Man and God, Ibn 'Arabī maintains that the relation between God and man is that of identity, of immanence,² of Qurb or nearness. Really qurb or nearness as affirmed in the verse, نَحْنُ أَقْرَبُ إِلَيْهِ مِنْ حَبْلِ الْوَرِيدِ—We are nearer unto him than his life-artery, means nothing other than the fact that God Himself is the very essence of the limbs and parts of man.³ Again, man is said to be created after the

to appearance ; it is conceived as In'ikās (انعكاس) or Reflection, which is well-nigh equivalent to Tajallī or Emanation. But in the Mujaddid ḡill in the beginning means shadow which signifies resemblance with the Thing. But as he advances, 'ḡill' becomes more and more of a mere shadow and indicates insignificance and unreality. In the end it comes to mean only an effect.

¹ ShF., p. 113, line 12, and p. 116, lines 10, 11, 13, 14.

² *Ibid.*, p. 77, lines 1, 2, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11 and p. 79, lines 9, 13.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 128, lines 2-5—text of FH.

image of Allah: خلق الادم على صورته—He created man after His own Image. That means that man possesses all the attributes of God. 'In fact it is His attributes that are manifested in man; they are bodily there in man.¹ That is why, it is said: من عرف نفسه فقد عرف ربه—one who comes to cognise his own self comes to cognise his God.² That is, knowledge of self is knowledge of God.

Ibn 'Arabi's Wahdat-i-Wujūd comes out also in connection with his theory of the Purpose of Creation. The purpose of creation, according to him, is the yearning on the part of Allah to know Himself: كنت كنزاً مخفياً: فاحببت ان اعرف فخلقت الخلق—I was a hidden Treasure; I wished that I should be known, so created the creatures. The yearning to know Himself is the yearning for self-perfection. This perfection consists in expression or realisation of His own self through the

¹ ShF., p. 252—text of FH.

² *Ibid.*, p. 185, lines 1-5—text of FH.

temporal and eternal qualities that manifest themselves in the world-process; in other words in actualising all the qualities that were potentially there in Him. Thus from whatever side we start, Ibn 'Arabī unambiguously leads to Wahdat-i-Wujūd.

Now turning to the Mujaddid we find that his mystic progress in general has had three stages,¹ viz., wujūdiyyat or pantheism, ḡillīyyat or adumbration and 'abdiyyat or servitude. At the first stage he has the spiritual experience of Wahdat-i-Wujūd. The object of mysticism at this stage is to turn the belief based on faith or reason into sure and certain knowledge based on direct experience with regard to God and His relation to man and the world,—that God exists, that He is immanent in man and the world, and that His relation with the world is that of identity. This stage lasts for a long interval and the

¹ M., Vol. I, Ep. 160.

Mujaddid realises it in all its detail and in all its depth.¹ Then he passes over to the stage of *ẓilliyyat* or adumbration. This is a transitional stage. At it he finds that the world has a being of its own, though it is only the *ẓill* or a shadow, semblance of reality. Allah is the *Aṣl* or the Real. A sense of duality arises; he seriously begins to doubt *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd*; but he does not yet possess the clarity and the conviction to deny it forthwith. Indeed he yearns to stay on in this stage because it has affinity with *Wujūdiyyat*,—the world is seen as *ẓill* or adumbration of the *Aṣl* or the Real, *i.e.*, of Allah. He finds himself reluctant to outgrow this stage. In course of time, however, he outgrows this stage also, and passes over to the stage of *‘abdiyyat* or servitude the highest stage. Duality of God and the world now becomes clear to him like the light of the day. The

¹ M. Vol. I, Ep. 31; Vol. II, Ep. 42.

world and God are *two*. He is thoroughly convinced of this; and he must promulgate their duality whatever odds there be against him.¹ At this stage he realises that all his previous mystic experiences were really subjective and unreliable;—they did not correspond to objective "reality. No room is left now for the identity of God and man. His confidence in the objective validity of mystic experience is gradually being undermined. In the end he comes to realise that to speak of an experience of God, which the mystics do, is blasphemy. God is far and far above the grasp of our faculty of reason and of *kashf*:
 ٢ ان الله وراء الورا ثم وراء الورا²—Allah is beyond the Beyond, and again beyond the Beyond. Neither His being nor His attributes are directly knowable. The only justification for mystic discipline that remains to him now is not the possibility of the experience

¹ M., Vol. II, Ep. 42.

² *Ibid.*, Ep. 1.

of the Divine, but its trend towards the purification of morals.¹ The Mujaddid expressly realises here that Īmān-bil-ghaib or the faith in the Unseen alone is the truth.²

With these stages of the development of his mystic experience in view, we may now turn to the Mujaddid's criticism of Ibn 'Arabī's Waḥdat-i-Wujūd. Let it be remembered that the Mujaddid contests it exactly on the basis on which Ibn 'Arabī held it, *viz.*, mystic experience;³ though in the exposition of them both rational argument is mixed up with the description of mystic experience. That in God dhāt-o-ṣifāt or existence and essence, being and attributes are identical,

¹ Īmān-bil-ghaib (إيمان بالغيب): Faith in the Unseen,—Ghaib (غيب) is opposed to Shahāda, *i.e.*, to that which can be seen and observed, faith in entities which cannot be seen and observed, *e.g.*, God, Angels, Heaven, Hell, etc., is Īmān-bil-ghaib. The term is used in this dissertation with particular reference to the Being of God.

² Cf. M., Vol. I, Eps. 207 and 217.

³ *Ibid.*, Ep. 31; Cf. Ibn 'Arabī, ShF., p. 12, line 24.

and that the world is the *tajallī* or emanation, or mode of *ṣifāt* or attributes; these two premises necessarily involve *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd*. The *Mujaddid* must therefore meet each of these premises. Consequently he holds that each of these premises is invalid. The *ṣifāt* or attributes are not identical with the *dhāt* or being; but they are over and above the *dhāt*. This is a truth directly apprehended by *kashf-i-ṣaḥiḥ* or veridical intuition, i.e., by genuine mystic experience. Moreover it is also in harmony with Revelation, because the *Qur-ān* says: 'ان الله لغنى عن العالمين'—verily God is wholly sufficient unto Himself,—He needs none of the worlds; (29: 5)—the worlds or the creation being but only the *Ṣifāt*, in their actuality or realisation according to Ibn 'Arabī. He is perfect in Himself. The attributes, by which He turns to the world and creates it, are other than His Self. Indeed right reason also demands that the attributes

¹ M., Vol. III, Eps. 26, 100, 110.

must be other than His being.—Nor is the world the *tajallī* or emanation of the *ṣifāt* or attributes. For if the world were the *tajallī* of God's *ṣifāt*, it would have been identical with them; but the *ṣifāt* are perfect while the world is full of imperfections.¹ For example, human knowledge has no resemblance with God's knowledge, so that one may be called the *tajallī* of the other.² Further *Kashf-i-Ṣaḥīḥ* or true mystic intuition bears testimony to it that the world is not the *tajallī* or emanation of *ṣifāt* or attributes. Moreover when we turn to *waḥī*³ or Revelation, which is the criterion of the truth of mystic experience, it bears us out. It says: سُبْحَانَ رَبِّكَ رَبِّ الْعِزَّتِ عَمَّا يَصِفُونَ —thy Lord is holier than the qualities which they ascribe

¹ M., Vol. III, Eps. 113-114.

² *Ibid.*, Ep. 100.

³ *Waḥī* (وحي) is revelation in general but in Islam it is a revelation of specific nature. It is information or guidance communicated to a Nabī (نبي) by Allah through the agency of an angel or directly.

to Him (37:180). That is, there is no likeness whatsoever between the Divine and the human attributes.¹

Now where Ibn 'Arabī starts from the denial of the world as such and maintains that 'A'yān-uth-thābita' the existent essences of the world have not had the slightest touch of reality, and that it is God alone that exists, the Mujaddid observes that Ibn 'Arabī is talking at the stage of Fanā² or annihilation. It is after the mystic passes over to the higher stages, that he realises the error involved in this stage. It is then alone that he understands the reason of having formerly regarded the world as non-existent. At the stage of Fanā or annihilation the mystic was absorbed in the being of God and utter

¹ M., Vol. II, Ep. 1.

² *Fanā* (فناء) literally means self-annihilation. In mystic terminology it means the stage at which the mystic turns his face away from everything other than Allah and forgets it totally. The obliviousness leads in certain cases to the denial of everything other than Allah.

forgetfulness with regard to *mā-siwā*—things other than God had taken hold of him. Hence he could perceive nothing but God.¹ Consequently he began to deny the existence of everything else and affirm the being of Allah alone. Just as when the sun shines the stars disappear in its light and cannot be observed, although they are actually present in the sky and have not ceased to exist; in the same manner the mystic was so much occupied with the being of God that he was unable to apprehend and affirm other things in spite of the fact that the things were actually there.² In fact Ibn 'Arabī does not seem to have realised *Fanā* or annihilation adequately, for he is still aware of the world; that is how he could identify it with God.³ Secondly, Ibn 'Arabī's position does not satisfy the criterion of *kashf-i-ṣaḥih* or veridical in-

¹ M. Vol. I, Eps. 122, 291.

² *Ibid.*, Ep. 43.

³ *Ibid.*, Ep. 272; Vol. II, Ep. 35.

tuition, viz., it is not in accordance with 'Wahī'. It is against revelation. We have been taught by revelation that God is wholly other than the world, and that the world exists. Had it not been so, awāmīr-o-nawāhī or the commandments of commission and omission, and the actions in accordance with those commandments, should have become meaningless. The imperatives and the actions according to them can have meaning only if the world really exists. Otherwise reward and punishment cannot rightly follow on them and the Hereafter becomes meaningless.¹ Thirdly, it is scepticism to deny the objective reality and external existence of the world and call it unreal and non-existent; indeed it is a denial of God's attribute of *Ibdā'* or creation and of the fact that He really created a world.² Moreover to call it *mawhūm* will not do. For *mawhūm* may mean a

¹ M., Vol. III, Ep. 67.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. II, Ep. 44.

number of things. In one sense mawhūm means that the world is simply the invention of our imagination; it is nothing but our own ideas. In this case it would disappear if our imagination were to disappear. This is downright scepticism and denial of God's attribute of *Ibdā'* or creation, as said above; and it is wholly untenable. In the other sense, mawhūm means that the world does exist objectively, though its existence as compared to God's is as insignificant as the existence of a mere imaginary thing. In this sense it would be wrong to hold that it is identical with God.¹ For the world is contingent, while God is necessary; they can never be identical with one another. The former is temporal, the latter is eternal. One is subject to 'How' and 'Why', and the other is above it. Consequently from both the points of view, religious and rational, it is impossible to hold that the world does not exist, or that

¹ M., Vol. III, Ep. 58.

it is identical with God.¹

Further where Ibn 'Arabī starts with the sole reality of God, the Mujaddid points out that Ibn 'Arabī is speaking at the stage of Tajallī'-i-dhātī or vision of Being, i.e., the stage at which the mystic feels that he is directly apprehending the being of God. But the mystic discovers the error involved therein only when he outgrows that stage. Then and then alone he realises that God is wholly other and beyond this world, and that he cannot approach Him, and that the identity of the world and God was a fabrication of his own mind. Ibn 'Arabī took the world as identical with God because he did not pass beyond this stage. It was the highest stage of his mystic progress. Had he advanced further, he would have realised that God is beyond all *kashf-o-shuhūd* or intuition and experience.² Indeed had Ibn 'Arabī realised

¹ M., Vol. I, Ep. 31.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. III, Ep. 75

Tajallī'-i-dhātī or vision-of-being fully, he should have talked only of God, and not at all of the world and its identification with God.¹ Further, this mystic intuition of Ibn 'Arabī, unless interpreted otherwise, is absolutely opposed to Revelation. According to Revelation it is a heresy of the worst kind.²

Another aspect in Ibn 'Arabī's exposition of *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd* is his doctrine of *Farq-ba'd-al-jam'* or difference after identity. The objection that the Mujaddid raises in this connection is this: If it is true to say that *Ā'yān-i-khārijī* or existent essences have not had the slightest touch of existence, how is it possible that affirmation of God only *bit-tanzīh*, i.e., as a transcendent Being, can change His infinitude into finitude? God is existent and the world is non-existent and imaginary, having no objective being. How can an imaginary being set limits to the

¹ M., Vol. III, Ep. 32.

² *Ibid.*, Ep. 89.

existentially real? It is equivalent to saying that the mere idea of God's equal can destroy the quality of His uniqueness!¹ Secondly, if *taṣḥīḥ* or immanence must be joined with *tanzīh* or transcendence, the *mā-siwā-llāh* or things other than God cease to be. Hence it is why that Ibn 'Arabī maintained that worship of any object whatsoever is the worship of Allah;²—which is diametrically opposed to *waḥī* or Revelation. The Qur-ān teaches: *قل يٰٓاَهِلَ الْكِتٰبِ تَعٰلَوْا اِلٰى كَلِمَةٍ سَوَآءٍ بَيْنَنَا وَبَيْنَكُمْ اَلَّا نَعْبُدُوْا اِلٰهًا وَّلَا نَشْرِكُ بِهِ شَيْئًا وَّلَا يَتَّخِذَ بَعْضُنَا بَعْضًا اَرْبَابًا مِّنْ دُوْنِ اللّٰهِ ۚ فَاَن تَوَلّٰوْا فَقُولُوْا اشْهَدُوْا ۝* —Say: "O followers of the Book! Come to an equitable proposition between us and you that we shall not worship any but Allah and (that) we shall not associate aught with Him, and (that) some of us shall not take others for lords besides Allah; but if they turn back, then say: 'Bear witness that we are

¹ M., Vol. III, Ep. 74.

² Cf. ShF., p. 55, lines 4, 9, 10, 11.

Muslims'¹ ". That means that 'Ahl-i-Kitāb' or the people of the scriptures worshipped some things other than Allah, and that things, and beings other than Allah there are.² Thirdly, those who combine immanence with transcendence do not know that God is beyond the reach of our reason and comprehension, and that what they regard as immanent are mere fabrications of their own imagination, whom they have raised to the dignity of God. God is high above our *kashf-o-shuhūd*³ or intuition and experience. Fourthly, the stage which Ibn 'Arabī calls the stage of *Farq-ba'd-al-jam*', i.e., difference-after-identity, is not the stage of *Farq-ba'd-al-jam*'. That stage is attained only when the world and God are realised as different from one another, while Ibn 'Arabī did not realise them as separate and distinct. In fact Ibn 'Arabī did not reach this stage;

¹ Q., 3 : 64.

² M., Vol. I, Ep. 272.

³ *Ibid.*, Ep. 9.

that is why he proposes that one may call the 'real' God, or he may call it the world, or he may express his perplexity on account of their indistinguishability.¹ The stage of Farq-ba'd-al-jam' is realised only when the mystic differentiates between the world and God; and it is a higher stage than that reached by Ibn 'Arabī.²

Again where Ibn 'Arabī has based Waḥdat-i-Wujūd on the identity of aṣl and ḡill, i.e., the thing and its adumbration, the Mujaddid contends that the ḡill or adumbration of a thing can never be identical with the aṣl or being, the ḡill is only a copy or a likeness of the aṣl. In case of God the ḡill is contingent, and the aṣl Necessary. The essence of the contingent is non-being and that of the necessary being. Hence aṣl and ḡill can never be identical.³ For example, if the shadow of a

¹ M., Vol. III, Ep. 71; Cf. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, Ep. 285.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. I, Ep. 290.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, Ep. 1.

person is prolonged, it can never be said that the person is prolonged. Now, firstly, the world is not the *zill* of God; and secondly, even if it may be taken as the *zill* of God, the identity of the two is not proved.¹

As to man and his identity with God, Ibn 'Arabi is not right in basing it on the verse : *نحن اقرب اليه من حبل الوريد*—We are nearer unto him than his own life-artery. Certainly God is nearer to us than our life-artery; but the nature of His Qurb or Nearness is beyond our comprehension.² Nor is he right in his interpretation of *خلق الا ادم على صورته*—God created man after His own image. This does not mean that man is the embodiment of the attributes of the Creator. It only means that both God and the human soul are non-spatial, and that they resemble each other in this respect.³ Otherwise there is a vast difference

¹ M., Vol. I, Ep. 160.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. II, Ep. 46.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, Ep. 287.

between man and God, as there is, for example, between the spider that warily spins its web and a being who by a single breath can wipe out the whole structure of heaven and earth. God and man simply cannot be identical.¹—Again Ibn 'Arabī is not right in his interpretation of *من عرف نفسه فقد عرف ربه*—one who comes to cognise his self comes to cognise God. That knowledge of the self is the knowledge of God, does not mean that therefore the self and God are identical. No. It only means that one who has fully become conscious of the defects and imperfections in his own nature realises that values and perfections are possible only through God; and that God is the source and embodiment of all values and perfections.²

As to the Purpose of Creation, the Mujaddid observes that Ibn 'Arabī's position implies that God was not perfect in Himself; and

¹ M., Vol. I, Ep. 310.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. I, Ep. 234.

that He had to depend on the world for His perfections. But, firstly, this is against religion and against Revelation. According to Revelation God is absolutely independent of the world. ان الله لغنى عن العالمين—verily Allah is sufficient unto Himself and needs no worlds.¹ Secondly, according to Revelation the purpose of creation is not knowledge at all but 'Ibādat,² service. The Qur-ān says: ما خلقت الجن والانس الا ليعبدون—I have not created man and jinn but exclusively for 'Ibādat (51:56). However, one may say that 'Ibādat means Ma'rifat, i.e., knowledge of God. All the same, in the knowledge of God consists

¹ M., Vol. III, Ep. 110.

² 'Ibādat (عبادت) may generally be called worship but is not exactly that. It is rather the consciousness of one's own insignificance and humility in relation to a being whose qualities are incommensurable, and not the consciousness of the qualities of that being. Hence 'Ibādat' is any action performed with a will to be in harmony with Him. According to Islam Allah is exclusively the Ma'būd (معبود), object of worship. Ma'būdiyyat is the quality of being Ma'būd. 'Abd (عبد) is the person who performs 'Ibādat.

the perfection of man and not the perfection of God, who is perfect in Himself and is not affected by the creation of the world. He is as He was before the creation, *آن کما کان*—He is now just as He was, i.e., Perfect.¹

Wahdat-i-Wujūd or unityism is not true, wujūd or Being is not one, insists the Mujaddid.—The experience of Wahdat-i-Wujūd or identity of being is not objective; it is subjective, it is merely Wahdat-i-*Shuhūd*²—apparent identity—the mystic only feels or sees One. And the Mujaddid traces the origin of this mistake in mystic experience. How does

¹ M., Vol. I, Ep. 266.

² *Wahdat-i-Shuhūd* (وحدت شهود) or *Tawhīd-i-Shuhūdī* (توحید شهودی) means unity of appearance. It is the Mujaddid's interpretation of Wahdat-i-Wujūd. The exact translation is difficult. It may be translated as apparentism. According to him the experience of Wahdat-i-Wujūd is only appearance. It appears to be so but is not really so; it is mere *Shuhūd* or seeming. So Wahdat-i-*Shuhūd* or *Tawhīd-i-Shuhūdī* may be apparentism: however it is generally taken to mean the theory of creation propounded by the Mujaddid (pp. 149, 158, *infra*) which apparently a mistake. *Ṣūfiyā'-i-Shuhūdīyya* are the mystics who believe in this theory.

this subjective experience arise? The Mujaddid points out that the source of the experience is different with different classes of men. With some it originates in cognition; with others in feeling. The former begin with excessive meditation on the Unity of Allah, and come to interpret لا اله الا الله (there is no object of worship but Allah) as equivalent to لا موجود الا الله (none exists but Allah). The dawn of this kind of Tawhīd on the consciousness of the mystic is due to the dominant cognitive aspect consequent on persistent thinking and meditation on the Unity; by constant repetition it becomes impressed on his mind and he begins to imagine that he directly apprehends Wahdat-i-Wujūd or unity and identity. With others the experience originates in excessive love of the Divine Being. The mystic is lost in the object of his love to such an extent that he loses sight of everything else. He beholds nothing but the object of his love

and finds nothing other than Him. Consequently he comes to believe that none but the Divine Being exists. When he turns to the world he perceives the object of his love in every particle of it, and he comes to regard multiplicity only as a mirror or reflector of the beauty of the Beloved. Some of these mystics who are perfectly lost in the contemplation of the object of their love pray to remain always absorbed in it and yearn that their own existence may never be brought to their consciousness. They regard any reference to their own self as heresy. Their ideal is annihilation. They have no rest. Rest requires oblivion,—forgetfulness which is impossible when the fire of love is constantly consuming them. Yet oblivion is necessary. Hence they must occupy themselves with such pursuits as suit their capacities, keep their attention diverted and conduce to forgetfulness. So some of them take to music and dancing, and others to writing books and

giving expositions of the implications of their love-consciousness, viz., *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd*. But there are others who in course of time go forward in their mystic experience and outgrow this stage. In their case the experience of *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd* or unity and identity disappears once for all, and they never get it again. Then they repent of the pantheistic beliefs to which their former experience had misled them.¹

2.—*The Mujaddid's Tawhīd*

THE conception of *Tawhīd* as advanced by the Mujaddid himself is this. We cannot know God through *kashf-o-shuhūd* or intuition and mystic experience. Hence we should revert to Revelation and to 'Ulamā-i-zāhir or divines, because their conception

¹ M., Vol. I, Ep. 291.

is derived direct from Revelation.¹ Consequently the Mujaddid discusses dhāt-o-ṣifāt or the being and the attributes of God on the principle of Muslim theologians; and there he follows not the Asharite school but the Maturidite.²

As mentioned above, the Mujaddid passed through wujūdiyyat or unityism and reached ḡilliyyat or adumeration where the error involved in wujūdiyyat was revealed to him; and after ḡilliyyat, adumeration, he attained the stage of '*abdiyyat*'³ or servitude. At this stage he is so thoroughly convinced of the error of wujūdiyyat or unityism that he feels himself compelled to denounce it emphatically. It is at this stage that he clearly realises that mystic experience has no objective validity with regard to dhāt-o-ṣifāt or

¹ M., Vol. I, Ep. 286.

² *Ibid.*, Ep. 266.

³ '*Abdiyyat* (عبدیت) is the attitude appropriate to man that he takes towards God.

the being and attributes of God. Hence he confesses to the following negative attributes or peculiarity of the Divine Being; God is beyond all such *asma'-o-ṣifāt* or names and attributes as can be comprehended by us. He is beyond all *shuyūn-o-i'tibārāt*¹ or modes and relations, all *zuhūr-o-butūn* or externalisation and internalisation, beyond all *burūz-o-kumūn* or projection and introjection, beyond all *mawṣūl-o-mafṣūl* or realisable and explicable, beyond all *kashf-o-shuhūd* or mystic intuition and experience; nay even beyond all *maḥsūs-o-ma'qūl*, empirical and rational, and beyond all '*mawhūm-o-mutakhayyal*' or conceivable

¹ *Shuyūn* is plural of *Shān* (شان), literally state, condition rather an exalted condition or state. The word occurs in a verse of the Qur-ān كل يوم هو في شان—everyday He is in a new exalted condition (57: 29). Ibn 'Arabī and others seem to understand by it, Ṣifāt at a phase of theirs, a transverse section of the World-Process, the Universe or God at a certain point of time. But the Mujaddid puts *Shān* between *dhāt* and *ṣifāt*. According to him *Shān* is an aspect or phase of the *dhāt*, while *ṣifāt* are something over and above *dhāt* and derived from *Shān*. Cf. M., Vol. I, Ep. 286.

and imaginable, هو سبحانه وراء الورا ثم وراء الورا —He the Holy One is beyond the Beyond, again beyond the Beyond, again beyond the Beyond.¹ Whatever is known through mystic intuition is merely a subjective experience, without any objective validity whatsoever. In short, God can never be apprehended through mystic experience, Consequently *īmān-bil-ghaib* or faith in the Unseen is unavoidable. Such a faith is possible only when thought and imagination get tired in their futile efforts, and it becomes evident that God is unapproachable, inexperienceable, inexplicable and unknowable.² Such a faith alone is valid in His case, because it is in keeping with our limitations and His unapproachableness or Beyondness.

If it is possible for us to get to know anything besides this about God, that is through

¹ M., Vol. II, Ep. 1.

² *Ibid.*, Ep. 9.

Revelation. Therefore we ought to follow the theologians as they derive their conception of the being and attributes of God exclusively from revelation.¹ On that basis, the Mujaddid maintains that God is Khāliq or Creator of earths and heavens, mountains and oceans, vegetables and minerals as well as of human beings with all their potentialities. In short He is the Creator of all things, and He has *created them out of 'adam-i-mahād or pure nothing*. He alone is the bestower of all blessings, the healer of all ills and the provider of all needs. He is the Sattār² or Conniver who overlooks our sins, He is Ḥalīm or Forbearing who does not take us hastily to account for our wrongs. He deserves all praise and gratitude for His innumerable benefec-

¹ M., Vol. I, Ep. 287.

² *Sattār* (ستار) literally means concealer. It is a name of God. Because He knows our sins and our secrets and neither divulges them nor takes us to task there and then, but covers at them and graciously tolerates our sinful being.

tions. Man does not know even how to value His goodness and greatness. He is the Ḥādī or *Guide*, who through His Anbiyyā' or Apostles¹ enlightens the ignorant mankind according to their capacity of His existence and essence; and who informs us of what He approves and what He disapproves, and of the useful and the injurious in this world and the Hereafter. 'He is the Āḥad or One, the Waḥdahū-lā-Sharīk, has no equal.'² He is the only Divine Being; there is no one else who possesses the same ṣifāt or qualities, and He alone deserves 'ibādat or worship.³ He encompasses or comprehends everything, is everywhere with us, and is

¹ Anbiyyā' (انبياء) plural of Nabī (نبي); neither the word 'prophet' nor the word 'apostle' is a correct equivalent of the term Nabī. It means a person to whom guidance and information is given through sheer grace of God for the good of mankind.

² Waḥdahū-lā-Sharīk (وحدة لا شريك). The term really means the one who has no co-sharer. The conception is that He alone is the master of the universe and the object of worship. No one else shares these qualities with Him.

³ M., Vol. III, Ep. 17.

nearer to us than our own life-artery or ḥabl-al-warīd. But the nature of His Iḥāṭa or comprehension and Ma'īyyat¹ or co-presence, qurb or nearness is beyond our understanding. Ḥayāt or Life, 'Ilm or Knowledge, Quḍrat

¹ Ma'īyyat (معيت) literally means togetherness. Mystics have taken it from the Quranic verse : هو معكم ايما كنتم — that He is with you wherever you are (57 : 4). From togetherness Ibn 'Arabī concludes identity of God and man. The Mujaddid takes exception to this conclusion and holds that we do not know the nature of Ma'īyyat (معيت).—Qurb (قرب) literally means nearness. Mystics have taken the term from the Quranic verse : نحن اقرب اليه من حبل الوريد — We are nearer to him than his life-artery (50 : 16). Ibn 'Arabī holds that Qurb of God is identity with God. The Mujaddid denies this and maintains that the nature of Qurb is not known.—Iḥāṭa (احاطة) is encompassment or comprehension. Mystics have taken the term from the Qur-ān : كان الله بكل شيء محيطا — Allah comprehends everything (4 : 126). Ibn 'Arabī conceives it as inclusion and derives identity of God and man from it. The Mujaddid takes exception to it and holds that the nature of Iḥāṭa is incomprehensible, though at a certain stage he was inclined to hold that Iḥāṭa is comprehension by knowledge.—Siryān (سريان) literally means permeation. Ibn 'Arabī and others ascribe Siryān to Allah with reference to the world, i.e. iramanence. The Mujaddid rejects this.

or Power, Irāda or Will, Sam'-o-Baṣar or Hearing and Seeing, Kalām or Speech, and Takwīn or Creation belong to His attributes, which are like His being *bī chūn-o-bī chigūn* i.e., incommensurable and uncomprehensible for us.¹

Reflection on the Mujaddid's description of Divine attributes shows that they are of two kinds, negative and positive. The negative attributes again are of two kinds; firstly those which are meant to deny all imperfections in God's Being, e.g., that He has no equal and no rival, no parents and no children;² secondly those which indicate His beyondness, e.g., that He is not body or physical, is neither substance nor attribute, is not space or spatial, is not limited or finite, has neither dimensions nor relations, i.e., He is above the application of our categories of thought. Again the positive attributes are also of two kinds. Firstly,

¹ M., Vol. I, Ep. 266.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. III, Ep. 17.

relative attributes which are relatively true of Him, *e.g.*, Qidam or Self-Subsistence, Azaliyyat or Eternity, Wujūb¹ or Necessity and Ulūhiyyat or Worshipability. We affirm these attributes of Him only because the attributes opposite to them are signs of imperfections; and in comparison with these attributes denote perfection;—and not because they adequately describe His nature. Otherwise the Divine essence has nothing to do with necessity and possibility, etc. But human thought is confined to the three fundamental categories of being, *viz.*, necessity, possibility and impossibility: therefore it is proper to attribute necessity to Him. Secondly, essential attributes which adequately describe His

¹ Note: According to Islamic thinkers being is of three kinds: Mumkin (ممکن), Mumtana' (ممتنع), Wājib (واجب). Wājib is that of which the non-existence is inconceivable. Mumtana' is that of which the existence is inconceivable. Mumkin is that of which neither the existence nor the non-existence is inconceivable. Wujūb (وجوب) is the quality of being Wājib and may well be translated as Necessity.

nature and are absolutely true of Him. They form part of His essence, e.g. Ḥayāt or Life. 'Ilm or Knowledge, Qudrat or Power, Irāda or Will, Sam' or Hearing, Baṣar or Seeing, Kalām or Speech, and Takwīn or Creation.

As regards the relations between the dhāt or being and the ṣifāt or attributes of God on one hand and between dhāt-o-ṣifāt and the world on the other, the Mujaddid maintains that His ṣifat or attributes are other than and in addition to His dhāt or being, and that the world is the ẓill or effect of His ṣifāt or attributes. The problem really is a problem of theology. Hence the Mujaddid follows here the Maturidite school. However, he corroborates the conception on the basis of his mystic experience as well, and maintains that according to it too the attributes are not identical with the being and that the being of God is perfect by and in itself and does not stand in need of the attributes for its perfection. God is mawjūd,

has existence ; but he exists by His own being, by His own self, and not in virtue of the quality of wajūd or existence which has been added to this being. In the same manner He is Ḥayī—He is Ḥayī or Living by His own being, He is ‘Alīm or Knowing by His own being ; He is Qadīr or Powerful by His own being : He is Murīd or voluntary Agent by His own being ; He is Samī‘ or Hearing by His own being ; He is Baṣīr or Seeing by His own being ; He is Khāliq or Creator by His own being. His attributes, viz., existence,¹ life, knowledge, power, etc., are the ta‘yyanāt or determinations or the descents of His being. Indeed the Mujaddid would avoid the use of the term of tanazzul² or ta‘yyun because it tends to signify identity. According to him the ṣifāt or attributes are the aẓlāl or effects of the dhāt or ‘being ; and the world is

¹ M., Vol. III, Ep. 26.

² The Being is conceived as coming down from the high pedestal of Pure-Being—down to determinate existence. Hence *tanazzul* means Descent of Determination.

the *ẓill* or effect of the *ṣifāt* or attributes. The gradation or order of these *tanazzulāt-o-ta'yyunāt* or the *aẓlāl* in the system of the Mujaddid is that the Perfect Being is the cause of the quality of *wujūd* or existence. Then follows the *ṣifat-i-ḥayāt* or the quality of life, because life is not conceivable without existence. After life comes the *ṣifat-i-'ilm* or the quality of knowledge; after knowledge *ṣifat-i-qudrat* or the quality of power, and after power *ṣifat-i-irāda* or the quality of will; after will the *ṣifat-i-sam'* or the quality of hearing, after hearing the *ṣifat-i-baṣar* or the quality of seeing; after seeing the *ṣifat-i-kalām* or the quality of speech, and after speech, the *ṣifat-i-takwīn* or the quality of creation. The *ṣifat-i-takwin* or the quality of creation is the cause of the creation of the world; the world is its *ẓill*, *i.e.*, its effect, and not its *tajallī*, *i.e.*, its mode. These attributes of God are over and above the being of God, for the Perfect Being brings

them into existence one by one for the sake of creating the world; the gradation is logical. It is by means of these attributes¹ which He adds to His being that the Perfect Being who is sufficient unto Himself and needs nothing, turns to the creation of the world and creates it.¹

The Mujaddid's theory of creation is this: God is Wujūd-i-Kāmil or the Perfect Being, comprehending all *ṣifāt-i-kāmila* or attributes of perfection in His essence. He is sufficient

¹ That the *Ṣifāt* or attributes are *زاید علی الذات*, i.e., over and above the *dhāt* or being of God and not identical with it is the doctrine of the Maturidites whom the Mujaddid follows. These are conceived as additional to the *Ṣifāt* or attributes which go to make the essence of God. They are *Idāfī* or relative. They come to be in relation to the creation of the world and are produced by God in His own Self for that purpose. This is a mode of conceiving which avoids the pitfall of *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd* or unityism of which one premise was that these *Ṣifāt* or attributes are identical with the *Dhāt* or being (M., Vol. III, Ep. 26)—that the *Ṣifāt* are created and not part of the essence of God was also the doctrine of certain Mutazilites, but on a different ground. They held unity to be the essence of God, and consequently found the *Ṣifāt* to be multiplicity incompatible.

unto Himself, needing nothing whatsoever besides Himself;—not even 'adam or nothing as the opposite of His being. He decides to create the world. For the sake of this He creates the *ṣifat-i-wujūd*¹ or the quality of existence in His being; also He creates other *ṣifāt* or qualities, e.g., the *ṣifat-i-ḥayāt* or the quality of life, the *ṣifat-i-'ilm* or the quality of knowledge, the *ṣifat-i-qudrat* or the quality of power, etc., in Himself. These qualities are forms of this *ṣifat-i-wujūd*. Now opposed to this *wujūd* or existence is 'adam-i-maḥaḍ or pure nothing, opposed to this *Ḥayāt* or life is a form of 'adam called *mawt* or death; opposed to this 'Ilm or knowledge is a form of 'adam called *jahl* or

¹ Thus the Mujaddid holds that *Wujūd* or existence is an attribute which is produced by God and does not form part of the essence of God. He thereby seems to mean firstly that the being of God is of another kind, and we cannot call it *Wujūd* or existence of the kind we know; and secondly that *Wujūd* or existence of the things is like a quality inasmuch as it has been given to them by God.

ignorance ; opposed to this Qudrat or power is a form of 'adam called 'ijz or powerlessness, etc. God casts an in'ikās or zill¹—reflection or shadow of this pure wujūd or existence of His into its 'adam-i-mutaqābila or opposed nothing, i.e., into pure 'adam' or nothing and there comes to be finite existence. He casts a reflection or shadow of this Ḥayāt or life of His into its 'adam-i-mutaqābila, viz., into mawt or death and there comes to be finite life. In the same manner He casts a reflection or shadow of this 'Ilm or knowledge of His into its 'adam-i-mutaqābila, viz., into jahl or ignorance, and finite knowledge comes into existence. Thus the existence, the life, the knowledge, etc., of the finite being is the result of the mixture of 'adam or nothing and Wujūd or existence, etc. The essence of the

¹ Note that this in'ikās (انعكاس) or zill of which the Mujaddid speaks is not conceived by him in the sense of Ibn 'Arabī. By these expressions the Mujaddid really means that the wujūd or being, etc., of the finite is produced by this Wujūd, etc., of God, ~~as~~ will come out later.

finite in itself, however, is pure 'adam' or nothing, the 'wujūd' or existence, the 'ḥayāt' or life, the 'ilm' or knowledge, etc., which are found in it, are pure gifts of God. That is how the finite world has actually come to be,—has come into being out of nothing, and has acquired actual, real existence. So also the various qualities of the world and its objects.¹

In truth God alone has real, actual independent being; and the world has an existence beside God only as a gift of God. In reality the being of the world is not more than appearance,—appearance without genuine reality. And yet the appearance is not such as to depend on our fancy or imagination; it exists independently of us. The reality or existence of the world is something like this. Suppose there is a stick² of wood. One of its ends is put into fire and catches flame. The other end of the stick is held fast and quickly

¹ M., Vol. II, Ep. 1; *Ibid.*, Vol. II, Eps. 58, 60.

moved round in a circle. This would produce the appearance of a circle of fire. • Suppose this appearance is somehow perpetuated,—it is made to exist by itself. A circle of fire shall have been produced thereby. The existence of the world is of the kind of the existence of such a circle.¹ Or suppose a juggler by his magic produces the semblance of a garden ; the garden bears fruit. Forthwith the king who was watching the trick orders that the juggler be executed ; for the king believed that if the juggler were killed instantaneously the garden will continue to exist as a real garden. The story says that the garden of magic still exists and bears fruit. Now the existence of the world is like the existence of that garden. It is not real in itself ; reality has been somehow bestowed on it ; and it is a very unsubstantial kind of reality.

¹ M., Vol. III, Ep. 58.

² M., Vol. II, Ep. 44.

The Mujaddid insists that there is absolutely no relation between the world and its unique Creator except that the world has been created by Him and is a sign that indicates His hidden attributes. All other assertions, viz., ittiḥād or union or identity, iḥāta or comprehension and ma'īyyat or co-existence are due to sukr or the ecstatic condition of mystics. Those who have reached the higher state of ṣaḥw or sobriety are free from such so-called ma'ārif or cognitions. True, they too came across such cognitions in the course of their mystic journey ; but they have left them behind and they criticise them in the light of Revelation. Indeed, to speak of the relations of ittiḥād or union, 'ainiyyat or identity, etc., between God and the world is an awful misconception. It is a misconception of this sort. Suppose a highly accomplished man invents an alphabet and certain sounds to display his ingenuity and capacity. Someone comes forward and 'maintains \hat{t}he

alphabet and the sounds are identical with the inventor.¹

As to man, the Mujaddid holds that the essence of man is the soul, and that the soul is the creation of God. However, the soul does not belong to 'ālam-i-khalq' or the universe of process, to which material things belong; it belongs to 'ālam-i-amr' or the universe of instantaneous creation.² It is bī-chūn-o-bī-chigūn or incomparable and inexplicable. It is something unique which cannot be explained by something else; that is, it cannot be derived from anything else.

¹ M., Vol. I, Eps. 31, 287.

² 'Ālam-i-khalq (عالم خلق) is Universe of process. The distinction is based on the Quranic verse: قل الروح من امر ربي—say that the soul is my Lord's command (17:85). This is interpreted to mean that the rūḥ (روح) does not belong to 'ālam-i-khalq to which the material universe belongs, but to another 'ālam, viz., the 'ālam-i-amr, the world of instantaneous creation. The universe of matter is clearly the world of process—things in it gradually come to be in course of time. The rūḥ is therefore not such. It belongs to the world of instantaneous creation. The distinction suggests a rationalistic background, in which the perceptual is temporal and the conceptual non-temporal. Cf. M., Vol. I, Eps. 260.

Now the original inclination of the soul was to seek Divine approval. But the soul has been intertwined with the *'ālam-i-khalq*—it has been given a body. This has aroused in it certain new tendencies, e.g., to sin, to disobey God. This state of things has given rise to the need of purifying the soul and encouraging and strengthening its original inclination. The tendency to disobey God is the fountain-head of all evils and vices.¹ The soul begins to hate virtue and indulges in vice. The state is called *nafs-i-ammāra* or the Evil self. But in spite of sin and disobedience the soul preserves the capacity of overcoming vice.² So through purification there begins gradually to arise in it a state of repentance. This is called *nafs-i-lawwāma*

¹ MM., pp. 19-20.

² The Mujaddid emphatically maintains moral freedom in man. For it is *kufr* (كفر) or heresy to believe in *jabr* (جبر) necessity (M., Vol. I, Ep. 289), firstly, because the Qur-ān says *فمن شاء فليؤمن ومن شاء فليكفر*—so let him who please believe, and let him who please disbelieve (2: 29; Cf.

or the Reproaching-self. Having progressed further, it attains to another stage where it achieves perfect harmony with the Divine Will. To act according to any commandments of commission or omission ceases to be unpleasant to it. This stage of spiritual development is called *nafs-i-muṭma'inna* or the beatified self. This is the zenith of human perfection and the highest end for man; indeed it is the very purpose of the creation of man.¹—The attainment of *nafs-i-muṭma'inna* or beatified self is called the stage of 'abdiyyat or servitude. 'Abdiyyat' is attained when man becomes absolutely free from bondage to everything other than

M., Vol. I, Ep. 289) ; secondly, because لا يكلف الله نفساً الا وسعها—Allah does not impose upon any soul a duty but to the extent of its ability (2 : 286 ; Cf. M., Vol. I, Ep. 289) ; and thirdly, because Islam and reason conceive actions as subject to approval and disapproval and to consequent reward and punishment (M., Vol. I, Ep. 260). He discusses the question fully on theologico-rationalistic grounds in Epistle 289, M., Vol. I,

¹ M., Vol. II, Ep. 50 ; Cf. Q. 89 : 28-30.

Allah. Mark that love of God is not the end-in-itself, it is only a means; it is a means to dissociate oneself from mā-siwā-'llah¹ or things other than Allah and to get to 'abdiyyat or servitude.

The relation between man and God is 'according to the Mujaddid that of 'abd and ma'būd or the worshipper and the worshipped. 'Abdiyyat or servitude means that man should change his whole life according to the Divine will and should obey His commandments of commission and omission simply because they are His commands.² There is also another relation between man and God, viz., ma'rifat or cognition. But true ma'rifat or cognition only means that man should realise that he is incapable of knowing God. As Abu Bakr-aṣ-Ṣiddīq said: العجز عن درك الإدراك ادراك فهو سبحانه من لم يجعل للخلق اليه سبيلا إلا بالعجز عن معرفته to realise one's

¹ M., Vol. I, Ep. 30.

² Cf. M., Vol. I, Eps. 30, 160.

inability to comprehend Him is the true comprehension ; Holy is He Who has not kept any road to Himself open to His creatures except by way of realising their incapacity to know Him.¹

¹ M., Vol. III, Ep. 122.

CHAPTER II

The Reception of the Mujaddid's Conception of Tauḥīd

TAWḤĪD or unity of God is a characteristic tenet of Islam. In course of time the Islamic mystics gave it the form of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism. The influence of mysticism gradually permeated Islamic society. Waḥdat-i-Wujūd became an accepted dogma. It influenced the whole of Islamic society from top to bottom. It affected its religious attitude, it affected its moral attitude, it affected its deeds; it affected its æsthetic consciousness, it affected its literature and poetry; and it affected its philosophy and outlook. It was the deepest truth to which man could have access,—indeed it was the

real meaning of Islam's teaching. It was revealed to the initiated, to great and holy souls, and was directly apprehended by kashf-o-shuhūd or intuition and mystic experience. So it was an epoch-making event that a great personality like that of the Mujaddid, great in religious learning and great in mystic experience, took *Wahdat-i-Wujūd* up for criticism and evaluation, criticised it unsparingly and trenchantly, and exposed its errors in their very foundations and expressly and unremittingly denied the objective validity of the experience on which it was based; and further advanced a conception diametrically opposed to it, and insisted that his conception, and not *Wahdat-i-Wujūd* or unityism, was the genuine Islamic conception—the conception which alone is derivable from the revelation granted to the Prophet of God. Thereby the Mujaddid veritably gave a new turn to the Islamic mysticism and brought it nearer to the original teachings of

Islam. This was a revolution, and his ideas spread far and wide with such speed that the greater part of the Islamic world acknowledged him as the Renewer of Islam in his own life-time.

Few had the courage to oppose the Mujaddid. No one in Naqshbandiya school contradicted him. Other schools of mysticism too kept silent, though they seem to have stuck to Waḥdat-i-Wujūd. The first important personage who took up the cudgels seems to have been Shāh Walī-Ullah a divine of very great eminence and a mystic of the Naqshbandiya school. Shāh Walī-Ullah flourished about a century after the Mujaddid. About 1143 A.H. he wrote a small treatise فيصلة وحدت الوجود والشهود "Decision on the case of unityism and apparentism". The gist of his contention is that there is no substantial difference between the ideas of Ibn 'Arabī and the Mujaddid; that both mean really the same thing, viz., Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism,

that their differences are in reality only verbal. In his treatise Shāh Walī-Ullah begins with the claim that God almighty has granted to him the special gift of synthesis or reconciliation.¹ Further he makes it clear that he was not discussing the problems on the basis of first-hand mystic experience, but simply as an arbiter, keeping the statements of both Ibn 'Arabī and the Mujaddid in view and considering and evaluating them rationally.² This attempt of Shāh Walī-Ullah at a synthesis of Ibn 'Arabī and the Mujaddid led inside the mystic circles, and even outside them to a keen and prolonged controversy which lasted for over a century. In the following pages we shall try to follow it in its main outlines in important mystics.

¹ FW., p. 3, lines 9-15.

² *Ibid.*, p. 5, lines 13-15

1.—*Shāh Walī-Ullah*

SHAH WALI-ULLAH holds that Wujūd¹ or being is something qā'im-bi-nafsihī and muqawwim-li-ghairihī, existent by itself, and support of the existence of everything other than itself; and that this is an unequivocal dictum of *dhawq-i-ṣaḥiḥ* or genuine intuition. Wujūd or being is wujūd-i-munbasit or self-unfolding being; it takes up the forms of things. It has its tanazzulāt or descents. These tanazzulāt or descents are of two kinds—'ilmī and 'ainī—conceptual and existential. The first tanazzul or descent of wujūd-i-

¹ *Wujūd* (وجود) is Being or existence.—Wujūd-i-munbasit (وجود منبسط) is self-unfolding or self-emanating Being. It has had three stages of its descents. The first stage is Wujūd lā-bashart-ash-shai (وجود لا بشرط الشيء) indeterminate (concept of) pure Being. The second is Wujūd bashart lā-shai (وجود بشرط لا شيء), pure concept, i.e., the concept of determinate Being. The third one is Wujūd bashart-ash-shai (وجود بشرط الشيء), determinate existent being, the being of a particular existent object.

munbaṣiṭ is tajallī-bi-nafsihī—its becoming conscious of itself. As such it is all comprehensive and implicitly contains in itself all the details. The next tanazzul or descent is tafṣilī—the explicit or the detailed 'consciousness of itself. After tanazzulāt-i-'ilmī or conceptual descents come tanazzulāt-i-'ainī or existential descents. They in their very nature cannot be implicit; explicitness or detail is necessary for them. Now according to mystics the essence of contingent beings are nothing but modes and differentiations of the wujūd-i-munbaṣiṭ or self unfolding being. Consequently, when it is apprehended in its capacity as mutalabbas or dressed, it is the contingent being; and when it is apprehended in its capacity as mutalabbis or dresser, it is the necessary being.¹ For example, there is a piece of wax; it is moulded into various forms, e.g., man, horse, etc. All the same it remains wax; it is wax which has

¹ FW., pp. 12, 13.

taken these different forms. These forms are simply modes; their being is nothing but the wax.¹ At another place Shāh Walī-Ullah says that the wujūd-i-munbasit or self unfolding being is the common element of the perceptive and the conceptual. As such it is wujūd-i-munbasit or indeterminate being and the opposite of 'adam or non-being and is the hayūla or matter of all beings. At the second stage it is wujūd bashart-la-shai or pure concept, i.e., the concept of determinate beings, e.g., man, horse; and at the third stage it is wujūd bashart-ash-shai or determinate or existent being, e.g., Aristotle, my horse.² This is the doctrine of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd.

The doctrine which is called Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd or apparentism is this. The asma'-o-shuyūn or names and phases of the necessary being reflect themselves in their ā'dām-i-

¹ FW., p. 6, lines 12-18.

² *Ibid.*, p. 7.

mutaqābila or opposite non-beings, thereby the contingent coming into existence.¹ Now, contends Shāh Walī-Ullah, if we leave simile and metaphor aside, it is essentially the same doctrine as that of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd.² To say that the essence of the contingent beings are the asma'-o-ṣifāt or names and attributes of the necessary being differentiated in the conceptual stage, as Ibn 'Arabī holds, or to say that the contingent beings are the asma'-o-ṣifāt of the necessary being reflected in their ā'dām-i-mutaqābila or opposite non-beings as the Mujaddid maintains, is practically the same thing. If there be any difference between the two positions, it is so insignificant that the critic need not take it into account.³ Consequently the assertion of the Mujaddid that Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism and Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd or apparentism are different

¹ FW., p. 23.

² *Ibid.*, p. 7.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

from one another is simply an error,—Ibn 'Arabī too means the same as the Mujaddid does; and the controversy of *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd* or unityism and *Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd* or apparentism is only a verbal rather than a real one.¹ By *Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd* or apparentism all that is intended is to throw emphasis on the perfection of the necessary and the imperfection and insignificance of the contingent being. But even in this respect Ibn 'Arabī meets the Mujaddid; he too holds that the contingent is insignificant and all perfection belongs to the necessary being.²

2.—*Khawāja Mīr Nāṣir and*
Khawāja Mīr Dard

THIS synthesis or reconciliation, which really

¹ FW., p. 29.

² *Ibid.*, p. 7.

amounts to a denial of the problem, was however not accepted by mystics who believed in the *Mujaddid*, e.g., *Khwāja Mīr Nāṣir 'Andalīb* who maintained unequivocally in his voluminous book *Nāla'-i-'Andalīb* that speaking objectively *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd* or unityism is absolutely invalid; it is not the truth about reality. Objectively *Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd* or apparentism alone is valid. But speaking subjectively, i.e., in their bearing on the *sālik*, mystic and his spiritual growth, both the doctrines are directed to the same end, viz., to dissociate him from *mā-siwā*¹ or things other than Allah. *Khwāja Mīr Dard* discussed the problem first in his *Wāridāt-i-Dard* (1160 A.H.), and then at greater length in his *'Ilm-ul-Kitāb* (1172 A.H.) which is intended to be a commentary on the *Wāridāt*. It may be noted here that both the father and the son discuss the problem on the basis of *kashf*, or mystic experience. Indeed the

¹ NA., pp. 736-773; Cf. IK., pp. 183-186.

latter holds that each and every word of his *Wāridāt* and *‘Ilm-ul-Kitāb* is divinely inspired.¹

Khwāja Mīr Dard holds that the doctrine of *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd* or unityism in its correct and valid significance simply means that God alone is the self-existent being. It does not mean that the essence of the contingent is identical with the necessary and that man and God are identical with one another, or that God, like a *kulli’-i-ṭabī‘ī* or natural universal, is immanent in the individuals. For that would be rank heresy, *ilhād-o-zindīqa*. To take *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd* or unityism in the latter sense is due to sheer want of insight into what eminent mystics meant by it. In the sense that *Wujūd* or being is immanent in multiplicity, *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd* or unityism is a doctrine which is of no significance in religion whatsoever.² For *Waḥdat-fi’l-kathrat*

¹ IK., p. 92.

² IK., p. 183.

or one-in-many which is on the lips of the common folk and of every Hindu Yogi is a doctrine for which no *īmān* or faith in God and His Prophet is required. It is a very common-place doctrine which everyone can be made to grasp easily. It cannot be something for which prophets had specially to be sent by God with the mission of teaching it to humanity.¹ The other doctrine is *Wahdat-i-Shuhūd* or apparentism. What it really means is this: The contingent being cannot exist without the necessary being ;² they exist only by the light of the necessary being. Ignorant people, who do not understand the meaning of what the Mujaddid meant, wrongly attribute to him the belief that the world is the *zill* or adumbration of God. This view was taken by him in the course of his progress towards his final position. Most of the immature mystics, who in their self-conceit

¹ IK., p. 465.

² *Ibid.*, p. 184.

regard themselves as having attained perfection, when they go through those works of the Mujaddid in which he has discussed the duality of man and God and the doctrine of hama-az-ūst or 'all is from Him' think that he was ignorant of the truth of the matter; and that because Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism is a difficult conception, he could not fully understand or realise it. But they do not see that according to the verse, *كل من عند الله* —all is from Allah (4 : 78), the doctrine of hama-az-ūst or 'all is from Him'¹ is corroborated by revelation.² Consequently hama-az-ūst alone is the truth, and hama-ūst or 'all-is-He' is absolutely false. The net result is that objectively Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism is false, and subjectively Waḥdat-i-Wajūd or unityism and Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd or apparentism both bring about the same result, *viz.*, liberation of the qalb or 'soul from the

¹ IK., p. 187.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 184-185.

bondage of *ma-siwā-'llah* or things other than Allah. Hence if a mystic realises either of the two states, or both of them, that makes no 'difference.¹—Indeed neither of these doctrines descends from the Prophet;² both are products of later times. However, the doctrine of *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd* or unityism primarily abides by reason; and only secondarily by the *Qur-ān* and *Ḥadīth*, which it turns and twists to make them fit in with the requirements of reason; while the doctrine of *Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd* or apparentism primarily abides by the *Qur-ān* and *Ḥadīth* and only secondarily by reason. Says *Khawāja Mīr Dard*: “Most of the *ṣūfīya'-i-wujūdiyya* or pantheistic mystics follow their own reason and intuition, and they rely on the first instance on their own findings. Only in the second instance, they try by the way to follow the Holy Prophet also. They mould

¹ *IK.*, p. 184.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 609-610.

the verses of the Qur-ān and the sayings of the Prophet according to their own taste, as if they have nothing to do with the Shari'at or the law of Islam. That alone is valid which they come to know by their own reason and intuition. It is not their real object to follow the religion of Muḥammad. They have the conceit that they apprehend truth directly; their purpose really is to ascertain whether the contingent is identical with the necessary or different from it, or whether the created is identical with its Creator or different from Him. In this quest the reason is their only guide, and they go their way by its light alone; only they forcibly drag faith and religion along with them . . . while most of the ṣufiyya'-i-shuhūdiyya or apparentist mystics follow faith and religion in the first instance. They really believe in religion. Only in the second instance and under the guidance of faith do they permit their reason to act . . . As if they have nothing to do with

reason, but what God and His Prophet have affirmed, that alone is the truth for them. . . . They believe in their hearts that the truth is that which is taught by God and the Prophet, and that their object is not to inquire whether the necessary and the contingent are identical or different from each other. They steer their course in the light of faith, and forcibly drag reason along with them.¹

Consequently, urges Khawāja Mīr Dard, we should revert to Tawhīd-i-Muḥammadī or the unitarianism of Muḥammad. God is eternal and self-existent; He is other than the world of objects. He is not like kullī'-i-ṭabī'ī or natural universal inside it. The truth is that God exists by Himself with all His attributes which are His qualities of perfection; and the existence of the contingent beings makes no addition in His being, nor does their annihilation take 'away' anything from it. كان الله لم يكن معه شيء—God existed and

¹ IK, p. 610.

nothing existed along with Him ; and ان كما كان
 —He is even to-day exactly as He was
 before.¹

3.—Mawlawī Ghulām Yahyā

THE discourses of Khwāja Mīr Nāṣir and
Khwāja Mīr Dard are not openly directed

¹ IK., p. 186.

Note.—In 1162 A.H. 'Allāma Mīr Muḥammad Yūsuf Bil-
 grāmī wrote a treatise الفرع النابت من اصل الثابت (*The*
Growing Offshoot from a Firm Root), in which he deals with the
 controversy without directly entering it. He bases his con-
 tention exclusively on the Qur-ān and Ḥadīth and rejects
 Waḥdat-i-Wujūd, suggesting that the experience of God which
 unityistic mystics claim is, according to Islam, impossible in
 this life. His treatise is an exhaustive survey and review of
 the sources which the two schools claim for their doctrines in
 Qur-ān and Ḥadīth. However the treatise, though able and
 scholarly, does not seem to have been taken much notice of.
 There is extant only one copy of it which is in the handwriting
 of the author himself, in the Subḥān-Allah Section of the Aligarh
 University Library

against Shāh Walī-Ullah. Ghulām Yahyā,¹ a scholar of great eminence, expressly criticised Shāh Walī-Ullah in his *Kalimāt-ul-Haqq* (The Announcement of Truth—1184 A.H.) which he wrote at the instance of Mirzā Maẓhar,² a spiritual descendant of the Mujaddid. Ghulām Yahyā emphatically maintains that Shāh Walī-Ullah is absolutely wrong in holding that both Waḥdat-i-Wujūd and 'Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd or apparentism hold the same views as to the essence of things and the relation between the temporal and the eternal, and that there is no

¹ Mawlā Ghulām Yahyā (d. 1195 A.H.) was a scholar of great fame in the philosophical and religious sciences. He used to give lectures (*dars*) to students at Lucknow. He has written commentaries on many books of philosophy. In the end he entered mysticism under the guidance of Mirzā Maẓhar and gave up philosophy.

² Mirzā Maẓhar (1111-1195 A.H.), was the fourth spiritual descendant of the Mujaddid. He was the greatest mystic of his time in the Mujaddidī order. 'Indeed it is in the line of Mirzā Maẓhar alone that the complete Sulūk-i-Mujaddidī is preserved. He was a devout follower of the Mujaddid. He was murdered by a fanatic Shī'a in the year 1195 A.H. whom he forgave before expiring.

difference between the two doctrines. Indeed, urges he, the two doctrines can in no way be even reconciled.¹ For *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd* or unityism is based on complete identity of the created and the Creator, while *Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd* or apparentism is grounded in absolute difference between the two.² In the first place, says *Ghulām Yahyā*, according to *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd* or unityism the essence of contingent being are *Ā'yān-i-thābita*, i.e., the determinations of the *Asma'-o-Ṣifāt* or names and attributes of Allah.³ But according to *Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd* or apparentism the essence of the contingent beings are the *aẓlāl* or adumbrations which *Asma'-o-Ṣifāt* or names and attributes have cast in their *ā'dām-i-mutaqābila* or opposed not-beings.⁴ Now there is a world of difference between these two doc-

¹ KH., p. 23.

² *Ibid.*, pp., 24-26.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

trines. According to the former the contingent beings are modes of Asma'-o-Şifāt or names and attributes and identical with them; according to the latter they are the azlāl or adumbrations of the Asma'-o-Şifāt or names and attributes and the zill or adumbration can never be identical with the aṣl. In the second place, Shāh Walī-Ullah is totally wrong in saying that it was a mere oversight on the part of the Mujaddid to oppose the two doctrines.¹ No, the Mujaddid does not do it by the way; he is emphatic on the opposition. He is absolutely clear on the point. He insists on the difference between the contingent and the necessary over and over again in his epistles, and holds that it is heresy and atheism to identify the two. His epistles are full of such emphatic assertions.² In the third place, according to Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism, change enters in the being

¹ KH., pp. 28, 29.

² Cf. H., pp. 26, 28.

of God itself, for it is He who modifies/Himself and becomes the contingent world;¹ while, according to Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd or apparentism, by creation of the world no change is wrought in the being of God,—He remains intact. Any one who would carefully study these two doctrines, urges Ghulām Yaḥyā, would realise that they are so different from one another that neither can we reduce one of them to the other, nor is any reconciliation possible between them.² It may further be remarked that Ghulām Yaḥyā's discourse tends to suggest that he had one more objection to Shāh Walī-Ullah, namely, that Shāh Walī-Ullah had no right to speak on the question and deny Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd or apparentism, or identify it with Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism because he was not basing his contention on Kashf or mystic experience.³

¹ KH., pp. 25, 26.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 24-29.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 29.

Mirzā Maẓhar, the spiritual guide of Ghulām Yaḥyā, supports him on the point and wrote a Foreword¹ to *Kalimāt-ul-Ḥaqq*; and Shāh Ghulām 'Alī (d. 1290 A.H.) who was a great mystic, and who succeeded Mirzā Maẓhar, expressly says in this connection that Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism and Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd or apparentism are two different stages of the mystic journey; and for those who have been through both these stages, it is impossible to synthesise or reconcile the two experiences,—the implication thereof being that Shāh Walī-Ullah did not pass beyond the stage of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism and get to the stage of Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd¹ or apparentism.

¹ MtM., p. 81.

4.—Shāh Rafī-uddīn

SHAH RAFI'-UDDIN,¹ son of 'Shāh Walī-Ullah, forthwith wrote a voluminous book called *Damagh-ul-Bāṭil* or 'Crushing of the False' as an answer to Ghulām Yahyā in the same year (1184). All that is relevant in this book to our argument is briefly this. Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism is the true doctrine.² It is the truth of Islam.³ All eminent mystics have cherished it,⁴ while Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd or apparentism is a new doctrine, advanced by the Mujaddid who had not grasped

¹ Shāh Rafī-uddīn (d. 1249 A.H.). He was a younger son of Shāh Walī-Ullah, one of the very first translators of the Qur-ān in Urdu, and a well-known scholar. He wrote *Damagh-ul-Bāṭil* (دمغ الباطل) against Mawlā Ghulām Yahyā to vindicate his father's attempt to synthesise the doctrines of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism and Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd or apparentism. His argument is based on the commentary of *Fuṣūṣ-ul-Hikam* written by Shāh Sharf-uddīn, one of his father's pupils.

² DB., p. 8 (b).

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 10 (a)-15 (b).

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4 (a).

the argument of Ibn 'Arabī and believed that Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism was altogether different from Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd or apparentism.¹ The right course, therefore, is to take Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism as the basic doctrine and interpret Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd or apparentism in its light, as Shāh Walī-Ullah had done. Shāh Rafī'-uddīn does not take the argument any further, and his attempt in this field is mainly a heated apology in favour of his great father.²

5.—*Shāh Sayyid Aḥmad Barelwī*

SHAH SAYYID AHMAD BARELWI too contributed to the controversy on Waḥdat-i-Wujūd

¹ DB., p. 4 (a).

² Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 3 (b), 4 (a).

Note : Shāh Ismā'il Shāhid (1194-1247 A.H.) was a grandson of Shāh Walī-Ullah. He too wrote a book called '*Ābaqāt* (عَبَقَات) or Perfumes of the reconciliation of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism' and Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd or apparentism. Shāh Ismā'il

or unityism. His whole discourse is based on Kashf-o-Shuhūd or direct mystic experience, and is to be found in Širāt-i-Mustaqīm (1233 A.H.)¹. He says that when love dominates the mystic, the yearning for Taqarrub or nearness and communion with God grows more and more intense in his soul. This state gradually overpowers him. In this connection he attains to the stages of Fanā and Baqā, annihilation and resuscitation. Thus his condi-

expressly acknowledges that his argument is not based on Kashf or direct mystic experience (At., p. 33). He holds that Ibn 'Arabī is right and the Mujaddid wrong. The difficulties, which are attributed to Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism can be, thinks Shāh Ismā'il, squarely met on his own theory. His theory is very much the same as Berkeley's later position. It is this. When God chose to rule as an absolute monarch, He created the universe on the best design. The world is for us objectively real; it is not imaginary or illusive. But in fact it is not outside the mind of God; it is in it. It exists only as an idea in the Divine Mind (At., عقبه 17, pp. 26, 27).—That is what Nicholson would call Panentheism, and distinguishes from pantheism. But afterwards Shāh Ismā'il Shāhīd became a follower of Shāh Sayyid Aḥmad Barelwī. That means that Shāh Ismā'il changed his views and gave up Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism. Cf. SM., pp. 12-13.

¹ SM., p. 95.

tion becomes that of a piece of iron, which is thrown into the furnace and fire permeates into its very being and to such an extent that it acquires all the characteristics of fire:—even its appearance becomes that of fire. One could affirm of it all that could be affirmed of fire. While in this condition, the piece of iron would, if it could speak, claim that it was fire itself. However the fact remains that it has not become fire; it is still iron as it was before. In the same manner when love of God takes hold of his being and he is completely overpowered by it, the mystic too begins to utter such phrases as ليس في جبتي سواه الله—I am the Truth, and —there is none in my cloak but Allah.¹ But afterwards if he rises to a higher stage, the mystic is blessed with another experience. He feels infinite expansion; he finds that all the realities of the universe and the contingent beings are dissolved in the being of

¹ SM., pp. 12, 13.

Allah, and the relation of identity which he had, at the previous stage realised between himself and God, obtain between God and all other existents. At this stage he begins to utter هو الاول والاخر والظاهر والباطن—He is the First and the Last, and the External and the Internal (57:3). But, firstly, to adopt the Shughl-i-nafi¹ or exercise of negation never means that really everything ceases to exist, the purpose of the shughl or exercise only is to do away with the consciousness of everything other than Allah. That everything else has thereby ceased to be is a mistaken notion; indeed it is absurd.² Secondly, if after Fanā or annihilation the mystic attains to the experience of Tawhīd-i-Ṣifātī or unison in attributes, he feels that He is the source of all multiplicity, and that he has expanded to the extent that the whole of the universe is accommodated

¹ Shughl-i-nafi.—It is the 'Dhikr of لا اله الا الله—'there is no god,' the practice of which creates the state of negation in the mind of the mystic.

² SM., p. 107.

inside himself. Here again arises the tendency in favour of the doctrine of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism. But he should not be misguided. He should remember that the idea is contrary to the fact and that his condition is merely an indication of 'the stage of Tawḥīd-i-Ṣifātī';¹ and after this will come the stage of Sair-fi'llah—the journey inwards Allah. In short, according to Shāh Sayyid Aḥmad in whatever manner Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism is experienced, it is no objective experience;—it is only a subjective experience. That is, thereby everything does not actually become God.²—Indeed Shāh Sayyid Aḥmad is absolutely opposed to Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism and regards it as one of the bid'āt or innovations of the pantheistic heretics and not worth discussing. However, as people talk of it frequently, one must know this much that the creatures are not

¹ SM., pp. 109-110.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 13, 46, 107.

identical with the Creator, though He is undoubtedly their Qayyūm or Mainstay. The relation might be conceived on the analogy of *ṣifāt* or attributes. The *ṣifāt* or attributes are not identical with the *dhāt* or being nor are they apart from it; they depend on the *dhāt*. In the same manner, *makhḷūqāt* or creatures are not identical with the *Ṣifāt* or attributes, nor independent of the *Ṣifāt* or attributes; they are *Maẓāhir* or phenomena of the *Ṣifāt* or attributes. The *Ṣifāt* or attributes are sufficient unto themselves; they need no *Maẓāhir*. Yet in spite of their self-sufficiency, God has in His wisdom chosen to give them phenomenal expression in the forms of created beings called *makhḷūqāt*. And that is really what great mystics meant.¹

It appears that after *Shāh Sayyid Aḥmad*

¹ SM., p. 46.

Note: About this time the controversy seems to be taken up also by *Ulamā'-i-Zāhir* (علماء ظاهر), the learned in general. Mawlā Fāḍl-i-Ḥaqq of *Khairābād* (1212-72 A.H.), who is regarded as the *Imām-i-ʿĀlsafa* or chief of philosophers of

Barelwī no mystic of eminence wrote on this controversy; while the mystics who belonged to the Naqshbandiya order got into confusion on the point under the influence of Shāh Walī-Ullah. The present-day mystics generally have taken to silence on the problem. Some of them do make no difference whatsoever between the two doctrines; while others do not want to open their lips on the controversy because of their allegiance both to Ibn 'Arabī and the Mujaddid. They would give out that each doctrine is valid in its own place, and that both Ibn 'Arabī and the Mujaddid are right.

the Khairābādī school of Philosophy in India, too wrote a brief treatise called روى المتجود فى وحدت الوجود in this connection. The argument wherein is purely philosophical and does not concern us here.

THE CONCLUSION

THE foregoing discussion brings out that those who contradicted or vindicated the Mujaddid, assigned a meaning to the term Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd as if it were the name given by the Mujaddid to his doctrine of the creation of the world and its relation to the Creator. But that is not correct. What the Mujaddid really meant by the expression was only this that the experience of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism which the mystic acquires at a certain stage of his spiritual development is only subjective; that it is mere Shuhūd or appearance; that the Waḥdat or unity which the mystic has experienced is only Waḥdat-i-Shuhūd or apparent unity. It is not the experience of objective fact; the experience

is not objective ; objective reality is different from what the mystic has experienced.

In fact the Mujaddid has given no name to his own theory of creation. If a name must be given to it, then *Tathniyya-i-Wajūd* or the dualism of being, or perhaps *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd* or the unity of the necessary, would be more appropriate terms.

Another point worthy of notice is that the Mujaddid's denial of *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd* or unityism is not based on rationalistic argument ; it is based solely on *kashf-o-shuhūd* or direct mystic experience. The Mujaddid holds that the experience of *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd* or unityism is a stage in a mystic's evolution. If the mystic outgrows this stage and attains to still higher stages, he comes to realise that the experience of *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd* or unityism was simply a subjective experience,—that the *Waḥdat* or unity he experienced was merely *Shuhūd* or appearance ; and that *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd* or unityism is not an

objectively real fact. Consequently those who intended to contradict the Mujaddid on the point, too, ought to have based their case on kashf-o-shuhūd, mystic intuition and experience. In other words, Shāh Walī-Ullah and his followers should have asserted either that the Mujaddid's statement that there are stages higher than the stage of the experience of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism, is wrong; or that there are still higher stages where the conviction in the objective validity of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism reinstates itself. But they keep absolutely silent on the point. Indeed they leave it alone and take recourse to logic and reason.

Next, a review of the arguments advanced by Shāh Walī-Ullah and others in favour of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism shows that all such arguments are untenable; and further that the arguments suffer from a confusion of the religious unity with the speculative unity which is characteristic of the mystic

consciousness.

Now to start with, they are arguments for a metaphysics of reality, intending to prove that it is one, single, individual, self-identical being. But after Kant, we know that unity of the world is only a "regulative idea," and not a proved fact,—and that any further description of reality as self-identical, etc., is absolutely beyond the competence of human reason. Taking the arguments in detail, we find that Shāh Walī-Ullah starts with the blank assertion that *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd* or unityism is a dictum of all sane rational consciousness. But plainly it is not that. Plain unsophisticated consciousness believes rather in pluralism than in monism. It must make a great effort of abstract thought to come even to dualism; while monism is a requirement only of the speculative consciousness. And even the speculative consciousness does not come to monism so simply as that; and when it comes to it, it comes to it by a strained

effort of abstraction and has to affirm it dogmatically. In the case of Shāh Walī-Ullah himself let us see what is the Wujūd-i-Wāhid or unitary being? It is, in the first instance, Aḥadiyyat-i-ma'qūla, i.e., that which is common between the conceptual and the empirical, the universal and the particular. Now to conceive that there is something common between two such disparate entities as the universal and the particular, requires the most strenuous effort of abstract thought; indeed it is hardly possible to grasp what the common element is between validity and actuality. In the second instance, Shāh Walī-Ullah speaks of it as Dhāt-i-baḥat or Wujūd-i-Munbasit—being which is absolutely without determination. Again, such a being is nothing that can be experienced or imagined; it can only be conceived by highly abstract thought. And then Aḥadiyyat-i-Ma'qūla and Dhāt-i-baḥat both are objects of thought,—concepts universals. Whence is it that Wahdat or

oneness or numerical unity, i.e., actual being, is ascribed to them? Indeed, one may ask, can it be ascribed to them? Clearly it can not,—not so long as they are concepts. Only when the concept, the universal is, by a leap over an unbridgeable chasm, turned into a particular, can numerical unity be ascribed to it. But can a universal be turned into a particular? Or can we even say this much that the concept has but one individual as its denotation? Hardly: for taken strictly there is no individual being which it denotes; and taken loosely it denotes each and every being, actual or possible. What has actually happened is this. The speculative unity was only qualitative; it did not require to be quantitative at all. But under the stress of religious consciousness it has been turned into a quantitative unity and has become the one,—a numerically single, individual existent.

Then we must ask, how does *Aḥadiyyāt-i-Ma'qūla* or conceptual unity, *Dhāt-i-baḥat* or

pure being, Wujūd-i-Munbasit or being-unfolding itself which is somehow one Individual which is the really real, become Mustajma'-i-ṣifāt-i-Kamāl, comprehensive of all perfections? For in itself it is the barest shred of being; how can we say that it has all perfections in itself? Undoubtedly it *actually* has no perfections in it. What can at best be said of it,—and said not as a necessity of thought but only as a requirement of explaining the empirical, is that it has all that *potentially* in itself which later actually came to be. But what has actually come to be are not perfections, but imperfections. We can therefore attribute only the potentiality of imperfections to it, and not of perfections!—Here again what has happened is this. The requirements of the religious consciousness have unconsciously pressed the thinker dogmatically to ascribe all that is good to this bare impersonal being and thereby turn it into Mustajma'-i-ṣifāt-i-Kamāl, the all-Perfect, *i.e.*, into the

personal Divine Being of religion.

Now coming to the Tanazzulāt or descents by means of which this Perfect Being comes to be the world, no reason whatsoever is advanced why the Tanazzulāt or descents do take place in this being. Taken strictly, i.e., as a concept which it is, it is devoid of all principle of movement. But even taken as an actual being which is the common element between the concept and the percept, or even between the mental and the material, it would be difficult to point out a principle of movement which is common to all these forms of being and which can therefore be ascribed to it. But what has happened is this. The speculative consciousness demands that the world-process must be explained as a manifestation of the assumed unity and hence a principle of movement be ascribed to it. This demand is met. 'A purpose is ascribed to it. It is affirmed that this being "wants to, know itself. Now the grounds of this

teleology are at bottom religious. Further characterisation of the process as 'ilmī or conceptual and then 'ainī or khārijī or existential is again hardly speculative. If anything, the motif is religious. It is the religious motif that is at work and has modified the speculative motif. For the unity has been conceived as God; it must therefore be first self-conscious and then produce Wujūd-i-Khārijī or actual existence out of itself.—However the speculative motif reasserts itself,—and that with a vengeance. The Wujūd-i-Khārijī or actual existence is a manifestation of Divine Being; it is that being itself in one of its modes; it is identical with it.

Now begins express conflict with the religious consciousness. The speculative consciousness is monistic; it will have the Primal Being immanent in the world; and it will have necessity as the principle of its progress. If

so, then evidently I am He and I am acting under stringent necessity; mysticism would hardly deny that. The question therefore arises: whence want and suffering in me, which are the very foundation of the religious consciousness; and whence duty and responsibility, or whence freedom without which no higher religion can survive for a moment?

Moreover, the doctrine produces that attitude of mind which is characteristic of the speculative consciousness, *viz.*, the contemplative one. The mystic aims at 'Irfān or knowledge, and passes his life in murāqibā-o-mukāshifa—contemplation and apprehension, having for his ultimate goal Waṣl or annihilation or absorption in the Primal Being. There is indeed no room left for immortality, though at times he speaks of it at the stress of the religious consciousness.—It may be noted that although here and there important elements of religious unity enter the mystic consciousness, it is the speculative

consciousness which holds the sway.¹

And we must inquire further: Is Shāh Walī-Ullah right in saying that the position of the Mujaddid is substantially the same as that of Ibn 'Arabī, viz., that it is Waḥdat-i-Wujūd or unityism and all that makes it look different is only simile and metaphor,—which indeed misled the Mujaddid himself to regard it as different? In justice to the Mujaddid, Shāh Walī-Ullah should have

¹ Attention may here be drawn to the fact that Taṣawwuf or mysticism in its various aspects bears too much resemblance to Neo-Platonism to which historically it is indebted. Its doctrine of Waḥdat-i-Wujūd and tanazzulāt—unity and its descents, its attitude towards life and society, rahbāniyyat-o-inziwā (رهبانیت و انزوا) or asceticism and monasticism, its end of man as 'irfān (عرفان) or knowledge, and waṣl (وصل) or unification and annihilation in the Primal Being, are to all intents and purposes the same as we find in Neo-Platonism. And more, it is grounded in the same effort of making a religion out of the speculative consciousness—in the same identification of the religious with the speculative unity, in which Neo-Platonism was grounded. It is further interesting to note that Neo-Platonism aimed at becoming a religion to save Hellenism from the onslaught of Christianity; and taṣawwuf or mysticism too is acting as an inward religion running inside Islam and really supplanting Islam.

shown in detail that the difference is only apparent and due to metaphorical language. But unfortunately he makes no such attempt. In truth the difference between the Mujaddid and Ibn 'Arabī is not of mere simile and metaphor; it is a very real difference. It is as real and as great as that between the speculative unity and the religious unity. It appears that the use of the word *ẓill* or adumbration in this connection is at the bottom of Shāh Walī-Ullah's assertion. *Ẓill* or adumbration is certainly a metaphor. But so is 'aks or reflection and *tajallī* or effluence and *talabbus* or dressing, etc., the terms which Shāh Walī-Ullah and Ibn 'Arabī use. *Ẓill* or adumbration, however, is a safer metaphor than *tajallī* or effluence, etc. It indicates otherwise from the *aṣl* or the thing, it indicates dependence on the *aṣl* or the thing, and it implies insignificance of the *ẓill* or adumbration, while *tajallī* or effluence indicates quite the reverse of it all;—indeed it

is intended to indicate the reverse. These differences in the implications of *zill* or adumbration and *tajalli* or effluence are undoubtedly of fundamental importance. And had the inquiry been carefully pursued, it would have become clear that the Mujaddid really meant by *zill* or adumbration not only something other, than the *aṣl* or the thing, but merely an effect of it,—indeed only, as an act of creation on the part of God.¹

¹Note: A brief note on *Aṣl-o-Zill* or the Thing and Adumbration is to be found on page 93 above. But it seems necessary here to trace the meaning of the expression *zill* in the Mujaddid more closely, as misconception of the term has given rise to confusion.

At the first glance, the Mujaddid looks like using the term *zill* very much in the sense of '*aks* (عكس) or *partaw* (پرتو), i.e., reflection; implying the suggestion that it is, so to say, somehow a part of the *aṣl*.—While at the stage of *Zilliyyat*, the Mujaddid tends to think of *zill* in this sense,—though even there *zill* indicates for him a lower reality than '*aks* or *partaw* (M., Vol. II, Ep. 1).

Later we find that he uses the term *zill* to indicate the *Ghairiyyat* (غیریت) or otherness of the multiplicity from the *aṣl* or God (Cf. M., Vol. I, Ep. 160); and that the purpose of employing it is to express the insignificance of the multiplicity in

What the Mujaddid really means is this. The contingent's own essence is nothing but 'adam or non-being; that is, by itself the contingent has no being whatsoever. Only Divine grace gives it being and gives it qualities which bear a faint and distant resemblance to the being and attributes of God. In other words, God produces the world, not out of Himself as Wahdat-i-Wujūd or unityism would say, but out of nothing. Its being is due to an act of creation,—creation out of nothing, which is something absolutely inconceivable for the speculative consciousness and its offshoot, *viz.*, Wahdat-i-Wujūd. And He gives it an existence of its own, which is not God's existence

contrast to the *aṣl* or God, as well as to show that the multiplicity *can not exist* without the *aṣl* (see M., Vol. II, Eps. 1, 11).

However in the discussion of *takwīn* (تكوين) or creation the Mujaddid strongly tends to use the term only in the sense of an *effect* (M., Vol. II, Ep. 4).¹ In the end the Mujaddid realises the inadequacy of the term, discards it, and speaks, in its place, of the *acts of creation* which are incomprehensible to man (M., Vol. III, Ep. 122).

but other than it. So also He gives it certain qualities, consciousness, freedom, etc., which are not God's qualities but its. Thus it becomes an agent in its own right and therefore responsible for its actions. Being a mixture of Wujūd and 'adam—of being and non-being, it is essentially finite and limited, though it has a yearning for improvement. Consequently, it needs religion; and it needs a religious unity with all the attributes of perfection. However, being limited it cannot comprehend the infinite; it can not see God. It can only believe in Him,—if God could be pleased to let it know that He exists and wants him to act in such and such a manner. Revelation performs this function and opens the way to the realisation of the human yearning to live in harmony with Him and in His presence. And revelation prescribes life of action, of struggle, of endeavour, and indeed of Jihād or fighting in the way of God in order to achieve this end,—to achieve

the state of mind called *Nafs-i-muṭma'inna* or beatified soul, and to attain to 'Abdiyyat or servitude. The 'Abd or servant remains the 'abd' in the end as he was in the beginning. He never becomes God. He is never re-absorbed into the being of God; he remains himself and survives death; he has immortality,—though of course God has the power to annihilate him. In life after death he will live, by sheer grace of God, in actual conscious presence of God, and see Him.

This is, if anything, the reclamation of the religious consciousness from the bondage of the speculative consciousness into which mysticism had thrown it. The doctrine is clearly dualistic and not monistic; holds to a transcendent, qualitative and personal unity, and not to an immanent, unqualitative and impersonal one; its unity is free and does not act under compulsion. While the world and the human soul are according to this doctrine not identical with the Primal

Being;—the souls bound in their action and gazing at it all the while and yearning to be re-absorbed in it. No, they have an existence of their own over against God, however meagre that existence be;—the souls being •free• agents, actively endeavouring to live the life prescribed by Him. Evidently this doctrine is as near to religion or Islam as *Waḥdat-i-Wujūd* or unityism is away from it.—And the Mujaddid seems to have successfully brought about this reclamation;—though he is not wholly out of the clutches of rationalistic thought in which his opponents are revelling, which probably is the reason why one had had the courage of questioning the value of his truly revolutionary achievement. However there can hardly be any doubt that the call of the Mujaddid to all Musalmans and Islamic mystics is

*Away from Plotinus and his host,
and*

BACK TO MUḤAMMAD.

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